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THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA:
RIGHTS INTERPRETATION AND COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Hoyt Webb-
I do hereby swear that I will in my capacity as Judge of the Constitu-
tional Court of the Republic of South Africa uphold and protect the
Constitution of the Republic and the fundamental rights entrenched
therein and in so doing administer justice to all persons alike with-
out fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution
and the Law of the Republic. So help me God.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Schedule 3 (Oaths
of Office and Solemn Affirmations), Act No. 200, 1993.
I swear that, as Judge of the Constitutional Court, I will be faithful
to the Republic of South Africa, will uphold and protect the Consti-
tution and the human rights entrenched in it, and will administer
justice to all persons alike withwut fear, favour or prejudice, in ac-
cordance with the Constitution and the Law. So help me God.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Schedule 2
(Oaths and Solemn Affirmations), Act 108 of 1996.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, South Africa adopted a transitional or interim Constitu-
tion (also referred to as the "IC"), enshrining a non-racial, multiparty
democracy, based on respect for universal rights.' This uras a monu-
mental achievement considering the complex and often horrific his-
tory of the Republic and the increasing racial, ethnic and religious
tensions worldwide.2 A new society, however, could not be created by
Hoyt Webb is an associate at Brown and Wood, LLP in NewYork City and a term member
of the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as a law cerk for Justice Arthur Chaskalson.
President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa, in the Court's first year.
'SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (interim Constitution) (entering into effect on April 27, 1994).
Stephen Ellmann provides a good discussion of the social and political context. Ser Ste-
phen Ellmann, The New South African Constitution and Ethnic Division, 26 COLt.%t. Ht'.%I. RTs. L
REv. 5,44 (1994) (examining the efforts of the drafters of the IC to overcome ethnic division).
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fiat. Thus, Nelson Mandela, along with his Deputy Presidents and the
new Parliament, worked to create the social and institutional struc-
tures necessary for the transition to a multi-racial democracy. On
February 14, 1995, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South
Africa (hereinafter "CCT" or "Court") was inaugurated and charged
with the challenging task of laying the jurisprudential groundwork
for the great new society depicted in the optimistic provisions of the
interim Constitution.! In particular, the Court was called upon to es-
tablish the legal framework for the recognition and protection of the
"Fundamental Rights" enumerated in Chapter 3 of the interim Con-
stitution, the South African counterpart to the United States Bill of
Rights.
4
As South Africans reinvented the social, political, and economic
order of their country, work on a second constitution also went for-
ward. The result, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, Act 108 of 1996 (hereinafter "Constitution" or "new Constitu-
tion"),5 benefited from the efforts of elected officials, numerous na-
tional and local outreach programs, and public debates and educa-
tional projects sponsored by both governmental and non-
governmental organizations. These efforts were designed to inform
the public of the activities of the Constitutional Assembly,7 to educate
the public about the importance of the Constitution and the drafting
process, to encourage active participation in that process, and to so-
licit the contribution of ideas, critiques and criticisms. In fact, the
Constitutional Assembly received more than two and a half million
submissions from the general public.8 Although bulky, with some 243
' See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 98 (establishing a Constitutional Court); id. at
sched. 3 ("Oaths of Office and Solemn Affirmations"); President Nelson Mandela, Speech at
the Inauguration of the Constitutional Court (Feb. 14, 1995) ("It is the task of this Court to en-
sure that the values of freedom and equality which underlie our interim constitution... are
nurtured and protected so that they may endure."); Speaker of Parliament Dr. F.N. Ginwala,
Speech at the Inauguration of the Constitutional Court (Feb. 14, 1995); ChiefJustice of the Su-
preme Court Michael Corbett, Speech at the Inauguration of the Constitutional Court (Feb. 14,
1995).
'See S. AFR. CONST. OF 1993 (IC), ch. 3, §§ 7-35 ("Fundamental Rights").
'The presidential proclamation, required by Section 243 of the new Constitution to set the
date of effectiveness of the new Constitution, was issued in 1997. It set February 4, 1997 as the
date on which the Constitution entered into effectiveness with the exception of only one provi-
sion relating to the election of chairpersons to municipal councils. See Proc. No. R. 6, 1997; see
also S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 14, § 243
6 These efforts included radio discussions, neighborhood symposia and seminars (some-
times even under tents in rural areas, if necessary), information distributed at religious and
sporting events, the national circulation of a free newspaper, Constitutional Talk, which reviewed
in detail the submissions, committee activities and debates in the Constitutional Assembly, and
the creation of an all-inclusive website at http://www.constitution.org.za/, which continues to
provide free access to working drafts, submissions, and other documentation.
' The National Assembly and the Senate formed the Constitutional Assembly that drafted
the new Constitution. SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 5, § 68(1).
8 See Working Draft of the New Constitution, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK (Constitutional Assembly,
Cape Town, South Africa), at 1.
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provisions, 6 schedules and 4 annexes, the new Constitution truly
represents the culmination of a very inclusive and fair process.
Chapter 2 of the new Constitution, entitled "Bill of Rights," differs
only moderately from the "Fundamental Rights" set out in Chapter 3
of the IC.9 To a certain extent, credit for these differences must be
given to the public submissions and to the drafters of the new Consti-
tution, many of whom also helped draft the IC. The drafting of the
new Constitution, however, also benefited from the development of a
constitutional interpretative methodology reflected in the judgments
handed down by the courts, in particular, the new Constitutional
Court. These decisions allowed the drafters to repair not only struc-
tural lacunae exposed by the courts, but also to address the concerns
raised in publicly or politically charged CCT decisions.'
Both the IC and the new Constitution contain provisions instruc-
tive to judicial interpretation of the rights they grant. Section 35(1)
of Chapter 3 of the IC, entitled "Interpretation," provides:
In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law
shall promote the values which underlie an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality and
shall, where applicable, have regard to public international
law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in
this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign
case law."
Section 39 of the new Constitution, entitled "Interpretation of Bill of
Rights," provides:
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or fo-
rumn-
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law."
2
These provisions clearly mandate that the interpretation of consti-
tutionally protected rights must be enlightened by the consideration
of international law and may also be influenced by judicial considera-
tion of foreign constitutional jurisprudence. Although there are dif-
ferences between Section 35(1) of the IC and Section 39 of the new
Constitution, the mandate supporting reference to extraterritorialju-
9 Cf S. Am. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2 with S. AFR. CoXsT. of 1993 (I), ch. 3.
" See, ag., State v. Mak-wanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 451-52 (CC) (striking down the death
penalty in the face of large public support); see infra Section II for a discussion of the Mahwany-
ane decision and the Court's response to popular pressure.
"S. Ant. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35(1).
S. AmR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 39.
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risprudence is clear in both texts.
3
The need for such a provision is obvious. Prior to the adoption of
the IC, South Africa was decidedly not "an open and democratic soci-
ety based on freedom and equality."14 Moreover, the complicity of
the South African judiciary in the enforcement of the oppressive
apartheid regime tainted public confidence in domestic notions ofjus-
tice. Therefore, reference to external jurisprudence from "open and
democratic" societies offered an appropriate method for assuring the
public that the "Fundamental Rights" described in the Constitutions
would be reasonably protected from future interpretational mischief
or bigotry. This same sentiment underpinned the decision to create
the CCT, rather than expand the jurisdiction of an existing court.
The drafters believed that the CCT would stand as a new, untainted
court to protect citizens' new Fundamental Rights and safeguard
South Africa's new constitutional ideals.
This article examines the evolution of the Court and its use of in-
ternational public law and foreign comparative law to interpret the
Fundamental Rights included in the interim Constitution." With the
character of jurisprudence transformed by the interjection of a new
constitutional order, the early cases brought before the courts of
South Africa for consideration involved fresh, new constitutional is-
sues at all substantive and procedural levels. Since the early CCT
opinions established the interpretive methodology now prevailing in
the South African court system, the bulk of the analysis presented in
this article describes the groundwork laid in four of the CCT's most
important early judgments:6  State v. Zuma and Others," State v. Mak-
wanyane and Another,1 Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re Dis-
" Notably, the new provision expands the interpretation imperative to nonjudicial fora and
modifies the judicial imperatives with regard to public international law. See infra text accom-
panying notes 189, 196.
"The interim Constitution not only altered the notions of democracy in South Africa, it
explicitly required that the courts promoted the values that underlie an "open and democratic
society." S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35(1).
" This article is limited to the practice of constitutional interpretation, particularly the
unique application of comparative constitutional interpretation by the CCT. For cogent analy-
ses of theories of constitutional interpretation potentially applicable in the context of the IC,
see generally Lourens M. du Plessis, Constitutional Interpretation: Theories and Practice, (1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional
Law); Lourens M. du Plessis &J.R. de Ville, Bill of Rights Interpretation in the South Aftican Context
(3): Comparative Perspectives and Future Prospects, STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 356, 356-392 (1993).
" It is tempting to review every one of the Court's judgments interpreting South Africa's
new rights. Considered together, they paint a landscape of constitutional jurisprudence on a
clean but lumpy canvas. Certainly, the broad pronouncements made in many of the judgments
handed down in these early years of the CGT's existence grants each decision a high degree of
probative value. Even so, understandable constraints require this Article's analysis to be limited
to the four judgments listed above. A complete and updated list of all the judgments handed
down by the CGI is available through the University of Witwatersrand's Internet page:
http://-wv.wits.ac.za/wits/witsl.html/.
"1995 (2) SALR 642 (CC).
"1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
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pute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Gauteng
School Education Bill of 1995,'9 and Azanian Peoples Organization
(AZAPO) and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa! ' Each
opinion will be dealt with in a separate section. When considered to-
gether, analyses of these four cases illustrate the important stages in
the evolution of the Court's use of comparative law with respect to its
Section 35 mandate, the Court's interpretation of the Fundamental
Rights, and the growth of the CCT as an institution.
The importance of these four cases is not diminished by the new
Constitution. Most of the changes to the Fundamental Rights in the
new Constitution are not expected to materially alter the content or
interpretation of the rights. In fact, the CCT's interpretation of Fun-
damental Rights under the IC can be credited with informing, if not
with instigating, many of the changes currently reflected in the Bill of
Rights.2 Thus, understanding the form and substance of IC interpre-
tations is critical to understanding the prospective evolution of con-
stitutional law under the new Constitution. Even so, where useful,
the analysis below also includes a brief examination of the Bill of
Rights provisions corresponding to the relevant IC provisions under
scrutiny.
Section II reviews the laying of the foundations for CCT rights in-
terpretation and for reference to foreign comparative jurisprudence
in the context of Zuma. The subsections in Section II address issues
concerning- (i) the Court's jurisdiction; (ii) the Court's declaration
of the Interim Constitution's supremacy over the common law; (iii)
the Court's first steps toward developing a coherent, interpretive ap-
proach to Fundamental Rights; (iv) the textual distinctions betveen
the United States and South African Constitutions which explain the
Court's adoption of a two-stage approach to rights interpretation in-
stead of the one-stage approach used to interpret the United States
Constitution; and (v) the issuance of retrospective declarations of in-
validity by the Court.
Section III examines Makwanyane as an example of the Court's
maturing interpretive approach. Section III is divided into a number
191996 (3) SALR 165 (CC).
1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC).
"It should be noted that many of the cases decided by the CCT after te New Constitution
became effective have considered issues that arose under the interim Constitution. Although
cases arising under the IC in the 1993-1996 period wlIl eventually wovrk their way out of the
court system, judgments handed down as recently as February 1998 were still being decided
based on interpretation of the IC, under which their issues arose. S&, ag.. City Council of Pre-
toria v. Walker, 1998 (2) SALR 363 (CC); Sanderson v. Attorney General, Eastern Cape, 1998
(2) SALR 38 (CC).
' For example, the first three judgments handed down which arose under the new Consti-
tution relied upon precedent established under the IC. Se State v. Ntsele, CCT 25/97 (OcL
1997) (visited Aug. 27, 1998) <http://-ww.law.1its.ac.za/judgements/ntsele.html>: Parbhoo
and Others v. Getz NO and Another, 1997 (4) SALR 1095 (CC); State v. Pennington and An-
other, 1997 (4) SALR 1076 (CC).
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of subsections that first provide an important historical background
to the case, and then (i) review the Court's initial pronouncement
regarding the use of legislative history and the interplay between con-
stitutional interpretation and public opinion, (ii) describe the
Court's maturing interpretive approach, and (iii) provide a detailed
analysis of how the Court undertakes its Section 35 mandate. Section
III further amplifies the theme first introduced in the discussion of
Zuma regarding the importance of interpreting the IC in the context
of South African history. Because Makwanyane is one of the most
comprehensive and detailed examples of the Court's reasoning, a
significant portion of this article is dedicated to its analysis.
While Section III provides an expansive application of the Section
35 mandate, Section IV explains the next stage of the evolution of the
CCT's interpretation of rights and highlights the discretionary as-
pects of Section 35's mandate by considering the Gauteng Provincial
Legislature decision. Section IV reviews the restraint exercised by the
CCT's in its use of international and foreign comparative legal analy-
sis and discusses the question of what criteria the Court should apply
in determining whether the exercise of discretion is justified. The
last subsection of Section IV uses the example provided by the Gau-
teng dispute briefly to provide comparative insight into the new Con-
stitution and to highlight the inherent complexities involved in the
creation of positive obligations by modem constitutions.
Section V addresses the Court's analysis in AZAPO that involved a
uniquely South African dispute over the constitutionality of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission created to help heel the wounds of
the apartheid Section V's subsections focus on the CCT's creative
use of international law and foreign experience in fashioning an in-
trospective and uniquely South African solution to the issue. Addi-
tionally, the analysis in Section V reveals that the case favoring re-
straint in the Court's use of comparative constitutional analysis is
more compelling in AZAPO than in the Gauteng Provincial Legislature
opinion because of the special role of the Truth Commission in the
context of South Africa's divisive history.
The Article concludes by drawing these observations together to
illustrate how the CCT has wisely undertaken its rather unique man-
date to refer to external jurisprudence.24 It highlights the evolution
of the Court's reasoning from the more exhaustive approach re-
flected in Makwanyane to the more selective approach reflected in
AZAPO. The conclusion assesses the Court's success in undertaking
its Section 35 mandate while maintaining a sensitivity to the more
" See infra Section V. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created to "promote
national unity and reconciliation" in the context of South Africa's violent past. See AZAPO, 1996
(4) SALR 671, 677 (CC) (quoting Section 3 of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of
1995).
" See infra Section VI.
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subjective elements of South Africa's social, economic and political
reality. It offers a predictive model for CCT's comparative interpreta-
tion under the new Constitution. The model highlights certain fac-
tors that may influence the Court's use of international and foreign
jurisprudence in the future.
II. ZUMA LAYS THE FOUNDATION
On April 5, 1995, the CCT handed down its first judgment.1 In
State v. Zuma and Others, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
Section 217(1) (b) (ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977,
which placed the burden of disproving the voluntary nature of a con-
fession on the accused.2 The prosecution tendered the confessions
of two individuals, each indicted on two counts of murder and one
count of robbery. The defendants pleaded not guilty, despite the
confessions tendered against them.28 At a subsequent hearing, the
accused challenged the legal presumption that their confessions were
voluntary and testified that the confessions were extracted by duress.2
The unanimous judgment of the Court, crafted by Acting Justice
Sydney Kentridge,5s rightly struck down the provision as violating the
right to a fair trial found in Section 25(3) of the interim Constitu-
tion.31
The Zumajudgment addressed a number of differentjurispruden-
tial issues in its brief eighteen-page decision. Lower courts had been
rendering judgments in constitutional cases without any real over-
sight for nearly a year, because the IC entered into force in April
1994, but the CCT was not inaugurated until February 1995.s In re-
5 See State v. Zuma and Others, 1995 (2) SALR 642 (CC).
The relevant section provided:
(b) that where the confession is made to a magistrate and reduced to
writing by him, or is confirmed and reduced to -writing in the presence of a
magistrate, the confession shall, upon the mere production thereof at the
proceedings in question-. -..
(ii) be presumed, unless the contrary is proved. to have been freely
and voluntarily made by such person in his sound and sober senses
and without having been unduly influenced thereto, if it appears from
the document in which the confession is contained that the confession
was made freely and voluntarily by such person in his sound and sober
senses and without having been unduly influenced thereto.
Crim. Proc. Act. § 217(1) (b) (ii).
See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 647. The constitutionality of the statutorily mandated burden
of proof was raised at a hearing on the admissibility of the confessions. S&e i& at 648.
See id. at 648.
The accused testified that they had been assaulted and threatened. See id.
ActingJustice Kentridge sat in forJustice Richard Goldstone, then serving as head of the
United Nations Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal. See Bob Drogin, 11 Activists Sworn In for New S.
African Court, LA TINiEs, Feb. 15, 1995, at AS.
"' See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 659; see also S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC). ch. 3, § 25(3) ('Every
accused person shall have the right to a fair trial.").
' Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act, 1994, Act. No. 2, § 16(1).
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sponse to this ripening need for guidance, the Court felt it important
to address a broad range of procedural and substantive issues in or-
der to maximize the utility of its pronouncements and provide a de-
finitive approach to constitutional interpretation.34 The Zuma judg
ment: (i) reviewed the claim of CCT jurisdiction,-' (ii) determined
the legal relationship between the common law and the IC,ss (iii) re-
vealed the CCT's interpretive approach to constitutional issues,"7 (iv)
demonstrated a coherent method of constitutional analysis which re-
spected Section 35's mandates,M and (v) provided examples of the
considerations pertinent to the issuing of orders by the CCT. 9 This
section will examine the Court's first steps in each of these areas.
A. The Question ofJurisdiction
40
The CCT held that although the referring court had ample juris-
diction to decide the constitutional issue raised in Zuma, which it
should have exercised, the importance of the constitutional issue
warranted the attention of the Court. On that basis, the Court cured
the defective referral and accepted jurisdiction. More specifically,
See infra Section II, Part A.
In certain instances where parties before the CCT had omitted a particularly useful argu-
ment, the Court certified additional questions to the parties for response. See Zuma, 1995 (2)
SALR at 657 (asking the Attorney General whether there is judicial discretion to reject admissi-
ble, but prejudicial evidence).
See id, at 649.
See id at 650-52.
'" See id. at 652-53. One of the more interesting features of the arguments submitted to the
CCT, especially in the earlier cases, was the number of pages dedicated to persuading the Court
which method it should adopt to interpret a particular provision of the IC and how that meth-
odology logically supported a rights interpretation favorable to the position being advanced.
These arguments were understandable considering that the CCT's interpretive style was com-
pletely unknown.
"See id at 653-57. The difference between the selection of an interpretative approach, see
infra Section II, and the application of a coherent method of analysis, see infra Section II, Part D,
illustrates the difference between theory and practice. The development of an appropriate
methodology that remains true to theory is important because the abstract nature of theory
does not easily lend itself to subjective application. The fact that it is possible to adopt a variety
of methodologies under the auspices of the same interpretive theory is one of the reasons judi-
cial interpretations vary and enrich the legal landscape.
See id. at 663-64.
"Section 102 of the IC attempted to establish procedural guidelines for the triage of consti-
tutional competence among the courts. SeeS. AFR. CONsT of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 102. However,
the language of the Section was inadequate to the task and confusing. Undoubtedly for this
reason and because the Constitutional Assembly found a wiser approach, the new Constitution
leaves the procedural aspects ofjudicial interaction on constitutional matters to the legislature.
SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 8, §§ 166(c), 169(b), 171,172(2)(c). But seeState v. Pennington
and Another, 1997 (4) SALR 1076, 1082-83 (CC) (noting the lack of legislation enacted to gov-
ern appeals from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court). Therefore, the purposes of
this first subsection are adequately served without dwelling on the formerly significant problems
surrounding questions of referral, appeal and direct access. Regardless of the short existence of
Section 102, the CCT sounded a critical note in Zuma emphasizing the responsibility of the
lower courts to pull their weight in constitutional matters.
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the Court based its jurisdiction on Section 100(2) of the IC, which al-
lows direct access to the CCT "where it is in the interests ofjusice."4'
The constitutional question in Zuma had been referred from the
criminal trial before Judge Hugo in the Natal Provincial Division.
Even though an agreement among the parties had given Judge Hugo
the requisite constitutional jurisdiction to determine the validity of
Section 217(1) (b) (ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act, ' he did not do
so. Instead, he referred the question to the CCT.3 The CCT cor-
rectly found the referral "wholly incompetent."" The Court ex-
plained that the conferral of jurisdiction permitted under Section
101 logically commanded such jurisdiction be exercised in the de-
termination of the issue at hand and not referred to the CCT.o
The Zuma case, unfortunately, was typical of numerous cases that
were referred to the CCT by judges fearful of exercising constitu-
tional jurisdiction." In response, the CCT patiently educated, en-
treated and, where necessar, chastised the courts to exercise their
responsibilities in this area.4 In Zuina, the Court began the impor-
tant process of instilling discipline in the judicial ranks with regard to
fulfillment of their constitutional obligations.
In fact, the Zuma Court requested that both parties address the
question of the competence of the referral, including what other
grounds for CCT jurisdiction might exist. This type of life-line was
provided on a number of occasions in 1995, and rightly so given the
novelty of both the form and substance of constitutional litigation
under the IC. Anticipating that the original referral may have been
defective, T. P. McNally SC, Attorney General for Natal, filed a Notice
of Motion requesting direct access under of Section 100(2) of the
IC.4
Section 100(2) stated, "The Rules of the Constitutional Court may
make provision for direct access to the Court where it is in the inter-
est ofjustice to do so in respect of any matter over which it hasjuris-
4 S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 100(2).
With certain exceptions, Section 101(6) allows the parties themselves to agree to vest a
lower court with constitutional jurisdiction it did not othernise posses. See S. Amt. CO. S. of
1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 101(6). In Zuma, the parties granted Judge Hugo jurisdiction. Sez Zuyra,
1995 (2) SALR at 648.
See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 649.
"i
"See i&
"The Court explained that the Attorney General sought direct, or interlocutory, access to
the CCT to resolve the constitutional issue because the lower courts would not address the
question and it would then be referred to the Court at the end of the trial. Se id at 649. The
Court noted in Zuma that '[i]t was in these circumstances that the Attorney General of Natal
applied under section 100(2) of the [IC] for direct access to the Court.' Id
, See State v. Vermaas; State v. Du Plessis, 1995 (3) SALR 292, 293-97 (CC) (hereinafter Ver-
maas) (explaining that only issues that arise during a trial that lay within the CCT's exclusive
jurisdiction as set forth in Section 102 (1) of the IC should be referred to the CCT).
"See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 649.
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diction." 9 In this regard, the relevant sections of Rule 17 of the Con-
stitutional Court Rules provide:
(1)The Court shall allow direct access in terms of section
100(2) of the Constitution in exceptional circumstances
only, which will ordinarily exist only where the matter is of
such urgency, or otherwise of such public importance, that
the delay necessitated by the use of the ordinary procedures
would prejudice the public interest or prejudice the ends of
justice and good government.
(2)The special procedure referred to in subrule (1) may be
sanctioned by the Court on application made to it in terms
of these rules.m
Although the constitutionality of the evidentiary burden represented
by Section 217(1) (b) (ii) does not on its surface appear to meet the
strenuous criterion of urgency that Rule 17 requires, South Africa's
long history of abusive police procedures under the former regime
offers one reason why the Court granted direct access in the Zuma
case, as well as in others.5 ' As Zuma explains, "The admissibility of
confessions is a question which arises daily in our criminal courts and
prolonged uncertainty would be quite unacceptable."5
B. The Interim Constitution and the Common Law
The interpretation of Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution that
defined a list of Fundamental Rights required nothing less than a to-
tal reassessment of South African jurisprudence. Nowhere was this
more evident than in criminal law and procedure. Since 1994, courts
in South Africa have applied a host of different approaches in their
attempt to interpret the effect of the IC on the common law. 3 In
" S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 100(2). In contrast to the optional language found
in Section 100 (2) of the IC, the new Constitution provides, "National Legislation or the rules of
the Constitutional Court must allow a person, when it is in the interests ofjustice and with leave
of the Constitutional Court - (a) to bring a matter directly to the Constitutional Court; or (b)
to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court from any other court." S. AFR. CONsT. of 1996 ch.
8, § 167(6) (emphasis added).
. CONST. CT. RuLEs, Rule 17 (1998) (visited Sept. 20, 1998)
<http://wv.law.wits.ac.za/docs/ccrnles98.html>.
" See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 650. One other case then pending before the Court, State v.
Mhlungu and Others, also raised the issue of the constitutionality of Section 217(1) (b) (ii). See
Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SALR 867, 889-91 (CC). One particularly illuminating historical review of
the policies and practices of the South African Police, both during apartheid and in the early
stages of transition to democracy can be found in GAVIN CAWrHRA, POICING SOUTH AFRIcA:
THE SAP AND THE TRANSITION FROM APARTHEaD (1993).
52 Zuma, 995 (2) SALR at 650 (emphasis supplied). In fact, it was argued that it was com-
monplace for the police to use forceful methods ranging from the deprivation of food and wa-
ter to actual physical torture. See id. at 648.
" For example, in Shabalala & Others v. Attorney General Transvaal and Another, Justice Ma-
homed explained the interim Constitution "retains from the past only what is defensible and
represents a radical and decisive break from that part of the past which is unacceptable. It con-
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Zuma, the Court made a definitive statement regarding the effect of
the IC on the interpretation of the common law. First, the Court
recognized the effect apartheid had on the old common law rights.'
Then, it introduced the concept of substantive review grounded in
the interim Constitution.55
Although the majority of judgments that the Court would later
hand down went to great lengths to contextualize the legal argu-
ments before the Court, reviewing their pros and cons prior to stating
the Court's position, Zuma advanced on the substantive issue with de-
termination:
The concepts embodied in these provisions are by no
means an entirely new departure in South African criminal
procedure. The presumption of innocence, the right of si-
lence and the proscription of compelled confessions have
for 150 years or more been recognised as basic principles of
our law, although all of them have to a greater of lesser de-
gree been eroded by statute and in some cases by judicial
decision. The resulting body of common law and statute
law forms part of the background to s 25 [of the IC].!u
Thus, the CCT acknowledged that the common law serves as the
starting point for constitutional analysis with regard to the rights of
detained, arrested, and accused persons.7 Nevertheless, the Zuma
court also recognized that the common law had been corrupted by
apartheid-erajurisprudence.-" The Court then addressed the question
of how constitutional ideals are to be applied to repair and reshape
the common law, noting with respect to the common law rule in
question:
The right to a fair trial conferred by [Section 25(3) of the
IC] is broader than the list of specific rights set out in the
paragraphs (a) to (j) of the sub-section. It embraces a concept
of substantive fairness which [sic] is not to be equated with what
might have passed muster in our criminal courts before the Consti-
tution came into force.
5
The Court then revisited the prevailing common law rule, most
recently expressed by the Appellate Division in State v. Rudman and
stitutes a decisive break from a culture of apartidd and racism to a constitutionally protected
culture of openness and democracy." Shabatata, 1996 (1) SALR 725, 741 (CC).
See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALRat 650-51.
Id. at 652-59.
See id& at 650.
17 See id.
See i& at 652 (noting, for instance, that the IC embraces a concept of substantive fairness
lacking in the application of laws under aparhed).
Id. at 651-52 (emphasis added). Section 25(3) (a) to (j) of the IC set out a non-inclusive
list of components of a fair trial. See S. AFm. CoNsr. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3. § 25(3); see also
Shabalala, 1996 (1) SALR at 739-40, 742-46 (discussing Section 25(3) %ith reference to the ac-
cused right to access the police docket, .iew the statements of police witnesses and consult with
the wimesses themselves).
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Another; State v. Mthwana.Y Pursuant to the rule upheld in Rudman,
judicial review on appeal was restricted to determinations of formal
or procedural irregularity or illegality, meaning that a court of appeal
"'does not enquire whether the trial was fair in accordance with 'no-
tions of basic fairness and justice', or with the 'ideas underlying the
concept of justice which are the basis of all civilised systems of crimi-
nal administration."'6' In response, Justice Kentridge wrote:
That was an authoritative statement of the law before 27th
April 1994. Since that date section 25(3) has required
criminal trials to be conducted in accordance with just
those "notions of basic fairness and justice". It is now for all
courts hearing criminal trial or criminal appeals to give con-
tent to those notions.
Thus, from that moment on, Zuma required all criminal courts in
South Africa to apply the spirit of the IC to interpretations of the
common law and established that the "concept of substantive fair-
ness" and "notions of basic fairness and justice" must be given tangi-
ble meaning in South African courts.
The Zuma Court grounded this approach in the language of Sec-
tion 35 of the IC, which requires courts, when interpreting Funda-
mental Rights, to "promote the values which underlie an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality."63 It is no small
achievement that the CCT broadly interpreted Section 35 and was
able to fashion such a direct jurisprudential pathway between a past
"characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and inustice, and a
future founded on the recognition of human 
rights. .....
C. Interpretative Approach: A Theory of Modified Generosity
Zuma clarifies the CCT's early support for a modified theory of
generous interpretation of Fundamental Rights. This approach has
the following characteristics: (a) a right must be interpreted in the
context of the broader objectives of Chapter 3, (b) the interpretation
must be sensitive to its effect on and integration into the existing
common law,65 and (c) interpretation must respect the language of
o 1992 (1) SALR 343, 372 (App. Div.). The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court is the
forum of last resort for non-constitutional matters. In as much as the vast majority of issues,
substantive or procedural, arising after the adoption of the IC became constitutionalized, the
Appellate Division saw its sphere of influence somewhat diminish in the early years of the CCT.
6' Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 652 (quoting Rudman, 1992 (1) SALR at 377).
SIcd.
6Id.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC) Epilogue (Statement of National Unity and Reconciliation).
The process of reshaping and rejuvenating the common law illustrated by the Court in
Zuma, see supra Section II, Part B, not only helps the judiciary keep its bearings in the changing
legal landscape, but also provides a concrete example of how to undertake its new responsibili-
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the constitutional provision.
As noted, early submissions before the CCT included lengthy,
academic critiques concerning the appropriateness of one or another
theory of constitutional interpretation, citing inter alia the grammati-
cal, systematic (or holistic), purposive and historical approaches to
interpretation.6 Parties actually contended that the Court would be
making an error if it considered the constitutionality of their claims
from the wrong theoretical vantagepoint.7 Zuina reflected its early ru-
minations on this topic and foreshadowed the debates more com-
pletely canvassed in Makwanyane.
The most attractive interpretive model reviewed by the Court de-
scribed a "generous approach" to constitutional interpretation," un-
der which a constitutional provision is interpreted with a view to
granting the interested party the largest possible measure of constitu-
tional protection. One possible hazard inherent in this approach is
that it promotes an over-emphasis on the outcome of an interpreta-
tion and its reflection on the underlying right rather than concern
over the actual interpretative methodology used to reach the hold-
ing. 0 From this perspective, wholesale adoption of the generous ap-
proach risks undermining the development of clearly defined rights
and of a predictable, or at least a reasonably consistent, method of
analysis for the determination of the content of those rights.
In his analysis, Acting Justice Kentridge provided a contextual
limitation on the utility of the "generous" approach to avoid the pit-
fall of subscribing to a solely ends-or values-focused interpretative
approach. In doing so, he initiated the Court's application of Section
ties under the IC. The dearest exercise by the Court of its power to reshape the common law
was reflected in the unanimous judgment delivered in Shabalala v. AtIonzey General, Transual
and Another, 1996 (1) SALR 725 (CC) discussed supra notes 53.59.
See supra note 37.
See, eg., Respondent's Heads of Argument at 43-48, Makwan)ane v. State. 1995 (3) SALR
391 (CC) (No.JCT 94/0001) (asking the Court not to follow the purposive approaches of some
scholars and instead to use a value-laden approach).
' Again, the purposive nature of this contextualization was clarified in Malmaryane. See
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 404-409; see also infraSection I. Part D.
' Many interpretive theories were reviewed or explored by the Court both in the submis-
sions of counsel and during oral argument. SeegenraUy Zuma, 1995 (2) &SLR 642 (CC). Tie
importance of this exploration into interpretative theories in Zuma is illustrated by the attention
it was given by counsel. Counsel for the accused preferred as generous an approach as possible
while counsel for the state argued for a conservative approach. Nevertheless, the basis for te
Court's ultimate, if partial, adoption of a generous approach rather than a wholly grammatical
approach was not revealed in the briefjudgement.
See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 652.
While we must ahays be conscious of the values underlying the Consti-
tution, it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written instrument. I am
well aware of the fallacy of supposing that general language must have a
single "objective" meaning. Nor is it easy to avoid the influence of one's
personal intellectual and moral preconceptions. But it can not be too
strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean whatever we might
wish it to mean.
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35 to constitutional interpretation. First, summarizing certain prin-
ciples outlined in the Canadian case of Regina v. Big M Drug Mart
Ltd.,7' Acting Justice Kentridge noted in Zuma that "regard must be
paid to the legal history, traditions and usages of the country con-
cerned, if the purposes of its constitution are to be fully under-
stood."72 However, he offered this borrowed bit of Canadian constitu-
tional jurisprudence, not to emphasize the importance of restricting
the scope of generous interpretation, but in the context of a develop-
ing argument against the continued viability of the pre-constitutional
common law understanding of a fair trial. By virtue of this minor
oversight, the Court's analysis in Zuma, though hinting at it, did not
adequately accentuate the usefulness of the purposive approach to
interpretation, which was, in fact, the point of Canadian Justice Dick-
son's comment.73 Although the Court did not seize the opportunity
to blend in the purposive approach to act as a mitigating force on
generous interpretation, the reference to Big M Drug Mart served to
highlight the point that interpretation must have some contextual
limitations.
Acting Justice Kentridge also captured a critical element in early
constitutional interpretation-the concept of plain meaning. He
emphasized that "even a constitution is a legal instrument, the lan-
guage of which must be respected. If the language used by the law-
giver is ignored in favour of a general resort to 'values' the result is
not interpretation but divination."74 The critical importance of hav-
ing respect for the language of the IC could not have been better
stated. As an added benefit, the focus on language in Zuma fore-
shadowed the question of the use of legislative history as an aid to in-
terpretation that was clarified in Makwanyane 5
D. Methodology: A Transnational Perspective on Rights
Having set the appropriate stage for constitutional analysis, Acting
Justice Kentridge addressed the key question: whether the presump-
tive voluntariness of a confession violates the constitutional right to a
fair trial, particularly given the importance of the associated right to
be presumed innocent as generously interpreted in the context of
Chapter 3's objectives. His answer noted that Section 35 of the IC
broadly establishes its objectives as the promotion of values that are
intrinsic to an "open and democratic society based on freedom and
7' [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
" Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 651.
"This oversight was addressed in Makwanyane. See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 403.
Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 653.
See infra Section III.
Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution provides for a host of specific rights. See S. Ant.
CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3.
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equality.' '
Section 35 is relatively novel in the history of constitutional law.
For example, in the United States, judicial reference to public inter-
national law and foreign constitutional jurisprudence is extremely
rare.* Even in countries more accustomed to referring to interna-
tional or comparative foreign law such reference has developed from
practice, has been limited to the non-constitutional context ofjudici-
ary review and has not been required or even explicitly permitted by
the applicable constitutions." Given the uniquely terrible history of
apartheid under which South Africa's legal and administrative systems
were established to enforce and maintain the segregation, marginali-
zation and minimization of the majority of South Africans of color,
the framers of the IC wisely ensured that the standards applied to the
construction of the post-apartheid le al system were not drawn from
the same well, but from purer waters.
Through its use of Canadian and other foreign law references, the
judgment in Zuma developed and applied the Court's new Section 35
analysis. The Zuma decision exposed two important and interrelated
issues which required significant fine tuning, much of which came in
subsequent judgments handed down two months later in June of
1995, especially in the Makwanyane decision discussed in Section .I.P
Those issues concerned the choice between the "one-stage" and the
"two-stage" techniques of rights interpretation and the selection of
appropriate international and foreign comparative sources. A third,
and ultimately more important issue concerning the Court's discre-
tion in its use of transnational jurisprudence is addressed in Section
TV below discussing the constitutionality of the Gauteng Education
Bill.8
E. The One-Stage and the Two-Stage Approaches
7 See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 652 (citing Qozeleni v. Minister of Law and Order and An-
other, 1994 (3) SALR 625 (E)).
Few comparable mandates for international and foreign comparative analysis exist. But
sew, ag., CAN. CONIST. § 27; HUNG. CONST. art. 7.
See, eg., Bruce Ackerman, 7ie Rise of World Constitutionalim 83 VA. L RE%. 771. 772-73
(1997) (arguing that "American practice and theory have moved in the direction emphatic pro-
vindalism," disregarding potential international influences).
"One notable exception is Section 7 of the Constitution of Hungary, which explicitly rec-
ognizes reference to international law. See HUNG. CONST. art. 7 (accepting, inter alia. the 'uni-
versally recognised rules and regulations of international lawi).
" See Gretchen Carpenter, The South African Constitutional Court Taking Stock of the Ear Deei-
sions, 1 HuM. RTs. & CONST. UJ. S. AFR. 24, 29 (1996).
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391; State v. Williams and Others, 1995 (3) SALR. 632
(CC) (outlavingjuvenile whipping); Vermas, 1995 (3) SALR at 293 (guaranteeing the right to
publicly funded legal representation as part of a fair trial); State v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) S&AR
867 (CC) (considering the right to a fair trial in the context of untimely service of an indict-
ment). For a good review of these decisions, see Carpenter, supra note 81, at 24-29.
"See infra Section V.
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When a constitutional right is granted without limitation, such as
the right to "due process of law" under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States,84 the content of the right, for ex-
ample, what is due, must be construed conservatively in each particu-
lar instance in order to allow incremental accretions to the right as
future cases may require. This is more readily apparent when one
considers, in contrast, a constitutional right granted subject to an in-
ternal limitation, such as the Third Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States which states, "No Soldier shall, in time of peace
be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.""' Axioms of
construction aside, it is clear that the right of homeowners not to
have soldiers quartered in their homes is subject to the existence of a
state of peace, and that the right of the government to station sol-
diers in United States homes is subject to the consent of the owner in
times of peace and subject to appropriate legislation in times of war.
Although its interpretation leaves room for judicial discretion, the
first stages of the analysis are intrinsic to the right: Is there a soldier
in the home? Is it peacetime and did the government obtain the
owner's consent? However, in the case of an unlimited right judicial
determination of the content of the right must build in the limits to
which the right is subject-what it means, what it does not mean,
when it may be abridged, when it may not and what procedural ele-
ments are adequate or inadequate for its protection. This is what is
meant by the "one-stage" approach to constitutional rights analysis.
The two-stage approach can be illustrated by returning to the ob-
servations made about the Third Amendment. At stage one, a com-
petent court notes that a homeowner has a right not to have soldiers
stationed in his or her home. At stage two, this court notes that the
right is subject to limitations, in this case internal limitations, which
allow the right to be abridged in certain situations. In this instance,
those circumstances are whether, if the alleged violation occurred in
peacetime, consent was obtained from the owner or, if the alleged
violation occurred in a time of war, the quartering of soldiers in the
owner's home was achieved pursuant to appropriate legislation. 7
The two-stage approach is more easily illustrated in the context of
constitutions that, unlike the United States Constitution, include
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. III.
"One could also argue that the Ninth Amendment, which states, "[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people," is a source of limitation since, from a Hobbesian point of view, the scope of one
right may be limited by the conflicting scope of others. See CHARLES BLACKJR., A NEW BIRTH OF
FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 10-17 (1997) (asserting a similar argument in
regard to unnamed rights).
'7 See, e.g., Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982) (using the two stage analysis of the
rights and protections contained in the Third Amendment with respect to state aims).
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limitations clauses."8 Such constitutions, including the interim Con-
stitution and the new Constitution, provide a list of relatively unquali-
fied rights, followed by a clause indicating the criteria under which
these rights may be subject to limitation.8m
In this context, Acting Justice Kentridge observed in Zuma that
the "single stage approach... may call for a more flexible approach
to the construction of the fundamental right, whereas the two-stage
approach may call for a broader interpretation of the fundamental
right, qualified only at the second stage."9 Although only cursory at-
tention was given to it in Zuma, the limitation clause in Section 33 of
the IC is at the core of the two-stage approach that emerged in later
cases and is currently used by the CCT. 9' Section 33 of the IC pro-
vided in part:
(1) The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by
law of general application, provided that such limitation
(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is -
(i) reasonable; and
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on freedom and equality; and
(b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in
question,
and provided further that any limitation to -
(aa) a right entrenched in section 10, 11, 12, 14(1), 21,
25 or 30(1) (d) or (e) or (2); or
(bb) a right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 or
24, in so far as such right relates to free and fair political
See, eg., CAN. CoNsr. §§ 1, 6(4), 15(2), 25, 26,35; GRUNDEGESETZ [Constution] GG arts.
18-19 (F.R.G.); A MAGYAR KOzTzsAsAG ALKOTM,.tANYA [Constitution] art. 8 (Hung.); IND\L
CONST. art. 33; NAMIB. CONST. art. 22; TANz. CONST. paras. 29-30; ste also UnnrwsalDedaratlin of
Human Rights, G-A. Res. 217A (M), 3 U.N. GAOR (Resolutions part 1) at 71. U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); Benjul Charters on Human and Peoples' Righ1so arts. 27-29, Organization of African Unity
(OAU) Doc. CAB/LE6/67/3/Rev.5 (Jan. 7-19.1981).
nlhis specificity of rights is another feature that distinguishes more modem constitutions
from the United States Constitution.
"Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 654.
"See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 33. Cf. S. AmR. CoXsr. of 1993 (IC). ch. 3. § 33
with S. AFm. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 36. Section 36 of the new Constitution stales:
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity.
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including -
(a) the nature of the right:
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of
the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of
Rights.
S. AFn. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 36.
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activity,
shall, in addition to being reasonable as required in
paragraph (a) (i), also be necessary.
(2) Save as provided for in subsection (1) or any other pro-
vision of this Constitution, no law, whether a rule of the
common law, customary law or legislation, shall limit any
right entrenched in this Chapter.
(3) The entrenchment of the rights in terms of this Chapter
shall not be construed as denying the existence of any other
rights or freedoms recognised or conferred by common law,
customary law or legislation to the extent that they are not
inconsistent with this Chapter.
(4) This Chapter shall not preclude measures designed to
prohibit unfair discrimination by bodies and persons other
than those bound in terms of section 7(1).9
In Zuma, Acting Justice Kentridge adopted a flexible approach to
Section 33 and analyzed the question using both the one-stage and
the two-stage approaches.3 He found that in many situations either
approach would lead to the same result. 4 He first observed that "re-
g2S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 33. Although this provision of the IC inspired much
debate in and outside of the CCT regarding the application of constitutional rights in legal dis-
putes between private parties (horizontal application of rights), see Du Plessis and Others v. De
Klerk and Others, 1996 (3) SALR 850 (CC) (holding against horizontality), Section 38 of the
new Constitution, S. AR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 38, specifically permits horizontal application
of the Bill of Rights, see also Halton Cheadle and Dennis Davis, The Application of the 1996 Consti-
tution in the Private Sphere, 13 S. AFR.J. HuM. RTs. (1) 44 (1997); Pierre de Vos, Pious Wishes or
Directly Enforceable Human Rights, 13 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. (1) 67 (1997).
'See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 654.
'Id. In this context, although I note my broad concurrence with textualism, under which
textual differences in constitutional provisions are deemed meaningful to interpretation, I do
not feel that the textual distinctions drawn by Ronald Dworkin to support his assertion that cer-
tain phraseology intrinsically invokes a moral interpretation while other phraseology does not,
is particularly useful in the comparative constitutional law context, as Frederick Schauer sug-
gests in his comparison of the United States and South African constitutions. Cf RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) with
Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295 (1997). The discussion
surrounding "moral reading" draws its relevance from the intra-constitutional distinctions in the
text of the United States Constitution, as the title of Dworkin's article affirms, and, in the con-
text of the current exposition, can be seen as an interpretive method useful within the one-
stage approach. Where, as in South Africa, the two-stage approach is applicable to the analysis
of all rights, although there may be distinctions between rights which have internal limitations
and those which do not, for example Section 32, which provided the right to public informa-
tion, and Section 9, which provided the right to life, restrictions on any right must still be inter-
preted under the limitations clause criteria. See S. AFR. CONsT. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 32(b) (in-
cluding the limitation of "where reasonably practicable").
Under the IC, the first two criteria are reasonableness and justifiability, each of which in-
voke analysis with "moral" content. See S. AR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 33(1)(a)(i)-(ii).
Clearly intra-constitutional interpretive distinctions in the context of the South African Consti-
tution must be based on alternative considerations. In this light, it makes a world of difference
that the drafters of the South African Constitution chose not to adopt a one-stage approach. It
might have been reckless or even dangerous not to provide the apartheid-tainted judiciary with
the interpretive imperatives set down in the limitations clause or Section 35's mandate that the
Court utilize foreign legal sources. SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35(1). That a simi-
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verse onus"95  provisions similar to Criminal Procedure Act
217(1) (b) (ii), are not uncommon to either foreign or South African
courts and are not per se unconstitutional in such jurisdictions." Sub-
sequently, he analyzed the offensive nature of the particular provi-
sion, using alternatively the rationale developed for one-stage analy-
ses in the United States and the United Kingdom,97 and the rationale
developed for two-stage analyses in Canada, to determine its uncon-
stitutionality.9
Justice Kentridge further noted that under the one-stage analysis
used in Leary v. United States,'O5 the United States Supreme Court held
a presumption of an intent to import marijuana was a violation of
due process.lo The Supreme Court reasoned that the presumed in-
tent was not rationally related to possession, the fact underpinning
the presumption.' 2 With regard to the two-stage approach, Ken-
tridge observed that in Regina v. Oake.'93 the Supreme Court of Can-
ada reached an identical conclusion on a very similar set of facts."
Like Leay, Oakes involved the constitutionality of alloing the proven
fact of possession of an illegal substance to give rise to a presumption
of an intent to traffic which the defendant bore the burden of dis-
proving. However, the Canadian Supreme Court first determined
that the reversal of the evidentiary burden of proof, the 'reverse
onus,' abridged the right to be presumed innocent as expressly pro-
vided for in the Canadian Charter.9 5 The Court then held that the
reverse onus was not justifiable because it unfairly tipped the balance
against the accused by relieving the prosecution of its duty to prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt-the standard required by the
lar result is reached in Zuma is testimony to the "heroic efforts" of the South African drafters to
which Schauer refers. This neither diminishes the potential relevance of the 'moral reading'
distinction within the text of the U.S. Constitution, nor conflicts with the conclusion supported
by both Dworkin and Schauer that, indeed, textual distinctions are important to intr-
constitutional interpretation. See Schauer, supra, at 1298-1311 (discussing and considering
Dworkin). However, in the context of comparative constitutional law, the analysis of textual
differences must respect the often-fundamental disparities in inter-constitutional structure and
jurisprudential context.
A reverse onus exists when a statute creates a legal presumption of guilt that the defen-
dant bears the burden of rebutting. See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 653.
6 See id.
"See id. at 653-59.
See id. at 653-56.
See id. at 653-59.
395 U.S. 6 (1969).
See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 654 ("[A] criminal statutory presumption must be regarded
as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary' and hence unconstitutional, unless it can be said with substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which
it is made to depend.") (quoting Leary, 395 U.S. at 36) (internal quotations omitted).
'"See i&.
," [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 655.
'"See iU.
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right to be presumed innocent. 0
Even though the application of either the one- or two-stage ap-
proaches may result in a similar outcome, Justice Kentridge noted
that the Canadian limitations clause and right to a fair trial are very
similar to their homologues in the IC.' 07 On this basis, he decided to
adopt a Canadian-style two-stage analysis as more fitting for Funda-
mental Rights analysis.' 8
Quite astutely, the Court wound these sources together into a
' See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 655. In this instance, the accused must disprove the pre-
sumption on a balance of probabilities. Following the logic outlined in the Canadian cases, the
South African Constitutional Court recognized that in this situation an accused who met his
burden of raising a reasonable doubt as to their guilt might still be found guilty because the
accused failed to supply enough evidence to negate the presumed intent. See id. at 655-57.
", See id. The Canadian limitations clause states, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." See CAN.
CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 ("Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms"), § 1 (punctuation
omitted).
An individual's right to a fair trial appears in as Section 11 of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, which states:
Any person charged with an offence has the right
(a) to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence;
(b) to be tried within a reasonable time;
(c) not to be compelled to be a witness in a proceedings against that
person in respect of the offence;
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;
(e) not to be denied reasonable bail without cause;
(f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a
military tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum pun-
ishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more severe
punishment;
(g) not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at
the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under Canadian
or International law or was criminal according to the general principles of
law recognized by the community of nations;
(h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if
finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or pun-
ished for it again; and
(i) if found guilty of the offence and if punishment for the offence has
been varied between the time of commission and the time of sentencing,
to the benefit of the lesser punishment.
Id. at § 11 ("Legal Rights").
'm See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 656 (adopting the test applied in the Canadian case Regina v.
Downey, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10, 12-14, a derivative refined from the test applied in the better known
Regina v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 119-21). ActingJustice Kentridge explained:
[Section 11 (d)] bears a close relationship to s 25(3) (a) of our Consti-
tution. In both Canada and South Africa the presumption of innocence is
derived from the centuries-old principle of English Law, forcefully restated
by Viscount Stankey... that it is always for the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused person, and that the proof must be beyond a reason-
able doubt. Accordingly, I consider that we may appropriately apply the
principles worked out by the Canadian Supreme Court in particular the
first two principles....
Id. at 656.
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compelling analysis of law encompassing very different legal s)stems,
using the weaknesses discovered under one form of analysis to inform
and strengthen the other.'O' Juxtaposing these observations and the
relevant South African provisions, Justice Kentridge ultimately
reached a conclusion squarely rooted in the exigencies of the IC. Al-
though the Court unfortunately failed to address Section 35's call for
reference to applicable international law,"0 the Court developed an
interpretation that is informed by foreign comparative jurisprudence
and yet sensitive to the distinctiveness of the South African constitu-
tion and history.
Even so, the analysis in Zuma falters somewhat by not clearly ad-
dressing the criteria laid down in the limitations clause described in
Section 33." Although, the Court adopted the Canadian methodol-
ogy for analyzing the content of the right to a fair trial, it neither
elected to follow the limitations clause analysis adhered to in Canada,
nor put forth its own analysis in this regard. The Court's limitations
clause analysis avoided any meaningful clarification of the methodol-
ogy to be applied at each stage.1' 2 Such an analysis would include dis-
cussion of the following questions: What are the components of the
required reasonableness analysis?".. How does the Court determine
whether the limitation is "justifiable in an open and democratic soci-
ety based on freedom and equality?" ' 4 What is the "essential content"
of the right to a fair trial?' 5 What additional criteria is the C(T ap-
plying in this case to reflect the constitutional requirement that a
limitation on Section 25 rights must also be deemed "necessary?"" '
Perhaps for the sake of expediency and perhaps because, as Justice
Kentridge put it, "[t]he State's problems here are manifold," these
matters were left over for the judgments expected inJune 1995."7
F. The Issuing of Orders
The Court held in Zuma that the reversal of the burden of proof
affected by Criminal Procedure Act Section 217(1) (b) (ii) was incon-
sistent with the Constitution, that the right not to be compelled to
confess was integral to the right to a fair trial, and that the burden of
proving that the right has not been violated must be proven by the
See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 654.
"0SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35 ("In interpreting dhe proision of this Chapter
a court of law shall[,] ... where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable
to the protection of rights entrenched in this Chapter.*).
... See i& at ch. 3, § 33.
11 See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 660-62.
.. See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 33 (1) (a) (i).
Id. at ch. 3, § 33(1) (a) (ii).
"5 See i atch- 3, § 33(b).
116 See id.
' See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 660.
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prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt."" Following that determina-
tion, the CCT declared Section 217(1) (b) (ii) invalid through one of
the two mechanisms provided by Section 98 (5) of the IC."9
Section 98(5) of the Interim Constitution provided the CCT with
a choice of invalidating a law or requiring the legislature to recon-
sider the provision and correct the constitutional defect. Section
98(5) stated:
In the event of the Constitutional Court finding that any law
or any provision thereof is inconsistent with this Constitu-
tion, it shall declare such law or provision invalid to the ex-
tent of its inconsistency: Provided that the Constitutional
Court may, in the interests ofjustice and good government,
require Parliament or any other competent authority,
within a period specified by the Court, to correct the defect
in the law or provision, which shall then remain in force
pending correction or the expiry of the period so speci-
fied.'21
This option grants considerable power to the CCT, and undoubtedly
would violate the separation of powers principle underlying the
United States Constitution. 2 ' Perhaps because of the scope of this
power and the importance placed on this issue by counsel, the CGT
later developed a practice of carefully explaining the reasons behind
its choice of invalidation over compelling parliamentary rectifica-
tion.'2
In Zuma, counsel for the respondent focused their arguments
against the issuance of a retrospective declaration of invalidity on the
basis of Section 98(6).'2 Section 98(6) stated:
Unless the Constitutional Court in the interests of justice
and good government orders otherwise, and save to the ex-
tent that it so orders, the declaration of invalidity of a law or
a provision thereof-
(a) existing at the commencement of this Constitution,
shall not invalidate anything done or permitted in terms
thereof before the coming into effect of such declara-
See id. at 659-62.
.. See id. at 662.
' S. AR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 98(5). Section 172(1) of the new Constitution, the
replacement for Section 98 of the IC states, in pertinent part, "When deciding a constitutional
matter within its power, a court (a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent
with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency." S. AR. CONST. of 1996 §
172(1).
" Although the result is quite similar under American law, i.e., a declaration of unconstitu-
tionality voids the continued application of that law, the grant of specific authority to the Su-
preme Court to order a legislative remedy or repeal within a specific time-frame would clearly
offend the United States Constitution.
"' See, e.g., State v. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR 632, 658-59 (CC) (beginning the practice ofjus-
tifying the Court's choice of method).
' See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 663-64.
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don of invalidity, or
(b) passed after such commencement, shall invalidate
everything done or permitted in terms thereof.':'
With regard to this issue, the Court held that it would do a great
injustice to allow confessions to stand after the effective date of the
IC, while invalidating the reliance upon Section 217 (1) (b) (ii) of the
Criminal Procedure Act from the date of the judgment.Is The CCT,
therefore, invalidated the use of Criminal Procedure Act Section 217
(1) (b) (ii) in a first step toward the establishment of a new legal order
in South Africa. In eighteen pages, it redirected the evolution of
common law, proclaimed the proper theoretical approach under
which the interpretation of fundamental rights should take place and
demonstrated the appropriate methodology for examining constitu-
tional questions. Along the way, the Court provided an insight to the
judiciary on how to make use of foreign comparative law to inform
constitutional interpretation. Similar to the United States Supreme
Court in Marbury v. Madison, 2 6 the CCT's assertion of primacy was di-
rect and unfaltering. As mentioned above, however, a number of
important matters were left over, by design or omission, for judg-
ments to be handed down in June of 1995.
Ill. MAKANYANE PROVIDES REFINEMENT
The abolition of the death penalty in South Africa was an historic
event both inside and outside the country.'* From the middle of
1985 to the middle of 1988, South Africa ranked third among the
world's countries in number of state ordered executions. '2 More
than 537 people were executed during that period.'2
Although Zuma was the first assertion of CCT primacy over an act
m SeeS. AFPR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 98(6).
1 See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 663-64. The court tabled the question of whether Criminal
Procedure Act Section 217(1) (b) (ii) should be invalidated in cases commenced before the IC
became effective upon determination of the meaning of Section 241(8). Se id at 664; se alsoS.
AFR. CONST. of 1993 § 241(8). The court addressed this issue in the Mhlungu opinion. &eState
v. Mhlungu and Others, 1995 (3) SALR 867, 890, 905-6 (CC) (invalidating any application of
Section 217(1) (b) (ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, in any criminal trial, regardless of
when trial may have commenced, or when the final verdict is given).
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and the duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.").
"See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 452-53. Newspapers around the world discussed the
CCT's decision in Makwanyane. Seee g., Margaret Burnham, The Death of a Death Penalty, BosT.
GLOBE, June 9, 1995; Howard W. French, South Africa's Supreme Court Abolishes the Death Penalty,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 7, 1995; L'inconstitutionnalitJ de la peine de mort pronontde par la justice sud-
afdicaine, L'EXPREsS, July 31, 1995, at 10; A Lesson from South Africa, LfrT. HERLD TRIte., June 12.
1995; The Right to Life in South Africa, BOST. GLOBEJune 9, 1995.
m See ANe=STY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KLLS .... Amnesty International Publica-
tions 204 (1989). Only Iran and possibly Iraq conducted more executions than South Africa
during that period. See id.
'9 See i&
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of Parliament," the Zuma decision spoke more to the supremacy of
constitutional considerations in the evolution of common law than
the Court's power to nullify an act of Parliament.'' In Mahwanyane,
the CCT struck down the death penalty as an affront to the right to
life and as an unconstitutional form of punishment, putting an end
to the gallows as well as the entire legislative scheme and penal system
underpinning them.32 In this way, Makwanyane stands as the South
African equivalent of Marbuty v. Madison.133 This extraordinary rever-
sal of South Africa's past was accomplished in the face of significant
public support for the death penalty by all races,4 and at a time of
escalating violent crimes
The unanimous Makwanyane judgment, running some one hun-
dred and twenty-five pages and comprising ten separate opinions,"'
dealt with a number of topics worthy of independent study outside of
the context of this article. 37 This section carefully reviews two of the
more important topics covered by the CCT, each of which find their
moorings in international and/or foreign comparative law. The first
topic is the establishment of governing principles for the judicial use
of legislative history.!" The second topic is the Court's statement of
the role of public opinion in the judicial interpretation of human
See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 659 (holding that section 217(1) (b) (ii) of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Act 51 of 1977 violated provisions of the interim Constitution).
See id at 650-52.
" See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 451-53.
"5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
... The Sunday Times reported that a contemporary survey found that more than eighty per-
cent of whites and more than fifty percent of blacks in South Africa's metropolitan areas were
in favor of retaining capital punishment. See Ken Vernon, Millions to Unite to Fight Court Ruling
on the Noose, SUNDAY TIMES (South Africa), June 11, 1995 (reporting on the plans of several re-
ligious leaders to organize their followers in support of the death penalty).
'" See Submissions by the South African Police as Amicus Curiae, § 12.8, at 149-53, Makwan-
yane, 1995 (3) SALR 391. At the time of the judgment, the murder rate was 53.5 citizens per
100,000 citizens per year. See South Africa Abolishes the Death Sentence, DALY TELEGRAPI-! (Lon-
don),June 7, 1995, at 17 (citing a March 1995 World Health Organization report).
" Justice Chaskalson delivered the main opinion of the Court, but each of the Justices
wrote separate opinions. Those concurring opinions were written by Ackerman, Didcott, Ken-
tridge, Kriegler, Langa, Madala, Mahomed, Mokgoro, O'Regan, and Sachs. Although the deci-
sion against capital punishment was unanimous, some of the Justices concurred fully with both
the reasoning and the order set out in the Chaskalson opinion, offering only additional consid-
erations or alternative emphasis on one or more of the reasons provided, whereas others con-
curred only in the order and proposed alternative reasoning for their conclusions.
'37 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Pretoria not Peoria FCIS v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA
391, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1285 (1996) (praising the Makwanyane decision for both its faith in the
transformative possibilities of law and the value of constitutional democracy); Heinz Klug, Strik-
ing Down Death, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 61 (1996) (reviewing the Makwanyane decision gener-
ally); Myron Zlotnick, The Death Penalty and Public Opinion, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM RTS. 70 (1996)
(discussing the role of public opinion in the Makwanyane decision);Jeremy Sarkin, Problems and
Challenges Facing South Afiica's Constitutional Court: An Evaluation of its Decisions on Capital and
Corporal Punishment, 113 S. AFR. J. L. 71 (1996) (commenting of the importance of constitu-
tional interpretation in the Makwanyane opinion).'3 See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 404-407; see also infra Section III, Part B.
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rights."3 9 This section otherwise restricts itself to analysis of Makwany-
ane's improvements on the interpretative approach and methodology
outlined in Zuma. A final subsection is reserved for further reflec-
tions on Makwanyane's legacy.
A. Background
Themba Makwanyane and Mavuso Mchunu were convicted in the
Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme Court on four counts of
murder, one count of attempted murder and one count of robbery
with aggravating circumstances and were sentenced to death. ' Their
appeals to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court were dis-
missed, but further hearings regarding the imposition of their sen-
tences were postponed until the constitutionality of the punishment
could be addressed by the CCT.'"' Although the Court delivered
Makwanyane second after Zuma, Makwanyane and State v. Mchunu, ar-
gued as one case, were the first cases argued before the Constitu-
tional Court.4 Argument was heard on February 15, 1995, the day
after the inauguration of the Court. In fact, President Mandela, al-
though carefully avoiding a public statement of his views on the case,
alluded to its historical importance in his speech at the Court's open-
ing ceremony.' 4
The importance of the capital punishment issue resulted in
heightened scrutiny of the new Court's deliberations. The Court, ea-
ger to uphold its image as an open, accessible and nonpartisan insti-
tution, responded by giving consideration to each issue raised by the
L'See id& at 404-409; see also infra Section MI, Part C.
,o See id at 401.
.. The postponement, because it was not accompanied by a formal order of referral, did
not amount to a competent referral to the COT, but the Court treated the language of the or-
der as an implied referral. See id. at 401. An effective moratorium on executions existed in the
early 1990s, during which time the government stated its intention to resiew the issues sur-
rounding capital punishment. See Heads of Argument on Behalf of the Government of the Re-
public of South Africa Represented by the IMinister ofJustice, v. 1, para. 12, at 7-8; Mahuanyane,
1995 (3) SALR at 402. In the decision, the Court explained:
No executions have taken place in South African since 1989. There
are apparently over 300 persons, and possibly as many as 400 if persons
sentenced in the former Transkie, Bophouthatsqana and Venda are taken
into account, who have been sentenced to death by the Courts and who are
on death row waiting for this issue to be resolved. Some of these convic-
tions date back to 1988, and approximately half of the persons on death
row were sentenced more than two years ago. This is an intolerable situa-
tion and it is essential that it be resolved one way or another without fur-
ther delay.
Id
1 Zumawas argued on February 23, 1995 and decided on April 5. 1995. St Zura, 1995 (2)
SALR at 642. Makwanyane was argued on February 15, 1995, but decided on June 6. 1995. See
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 391.
" See Roger Matthews, South Africa Court Must Rule on Death Penaly, FN. TtMES (London),
Feb. 15, 1995, at 5.
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party's oral and written arguments.44 In the Makwanyane judgment,
the CCT went beyond Zuma's use of foreign comparative jurispru-
dence. In observing the Section 35 mandate in Makwanyane, the
Court used international law, in addition to foreign comparative law,
to enrich its consideration of principal and ancillary issues before the
Court, including the use of legislative history.45
B. Legislative History
The main opinion in Makwanyane was written by Justice Arthur
Chaskalson, President of the Court.46 His treatment of legislative his-
tory reflected the Court's deep concern not to open a Pandora's box
of reference materials.47 The Court distinguished the use of back-
ground materials in constitutional interpretation from the process of
ordinary statutory interpretation.'" In this regard, the Court tenta-
tively acknowledged the comparative usefulness of such materials in
the context of constitutional interpretation.1
4
1
The Court also considered the use of background information by
other tribunals.'0 The opinion noted that the constitutions of the
United States, Germany, Canada and India are all interpreted with
the aid of historical background materials. 5' The Court also pointed
to the use of travaux priparatoires by the European Court of Human
Rights and by the United Nations Committee on Human Rights in in-
terpreting the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.152 The Court noted that the South Afri-
can "Multi-Party Negotiating Process was advised by technical com-
mittees, and that the reports of these committees on the drafts [were]
the equivalent of the travaux prparatoires relied upon by the interna-
tional tribunals." 53 On the strength of this analogy, the Court found
it acceptable to make use of similar materials for the interpretation of
the IC, but added certain qualifications.TM
The first qualification Justice Chaskalson offered requires South
African courts to consider the nature of the background evidence
'"See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 410.
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 412-15.
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 404.
... See id. at 404-409.
' "See id. at 404-405.
. See id. at 405.
" See id. at 404-409.
.. See id. at 405-406. The CCT recognized, however, that the courts in each country utilize
background materials in subtlety different manners. See id.
1
52See id at 406 (explaining that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention of Treaties 1969, or-
dered for signature, 8 I.L.M. 679, 692 (1969), permits the use of travaux priparatoires in the inter-
pretation of treaties).
'"Id. at 406-407.
'"See id. at 407.
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and the reason for its submission when assessing the weight given
such evidence in the interpretive analysis. " The second qualification
warned future courts against overemphasizing the importance of the
participation of "individual actors in the process, no matter how
prominent a role they might have played."5t In distinguishing among
secondary materials, the Court explained that the strength of the re-
lation between the information and the asserted position should be
paramount over its source.15
Justice Chaskalson added three more qualifications: "It is suffi-
cient to say that where the background material is clear, is not in dispute,
and is relevant to showing why particular provisions were or were not in-
cluded in the Constitution, it can be taken into account by a Court in in-
terpreting the Constitution.nIH However, he explicitly eschewed any
restriction on the Court's ability to adopt additional rules governing
the use of legislative history, stating, "It is neither necessary nor desir-
able at this stage in the development of our constitutional law to ex-
press any opinion on whether it might also be relevant for other pur-
poses, nor to attempt to lay down general principles governing the
admissibility of such evidence." 9 Justice Chaskalson also acknowl-
edged that "[b]ackground evidence may, however, be useful to show
why particular provisions were or were not included in the Constitu-
ton."16 Following this point, he noted that background materials in-
dicated that provisions concerning capital punishment were explicitly
left out of the IC based on an agreement, referred to as the "Solo-
monic solution," to leave the determination of its constitutionality up
to the future CCT.
161
C. Public Opinion
To understand the CCT's awkward position in terms of public
opinion, it is helpful to remember that apartheid's stranglehold on
civil liberties had only begun to be lifted in 1990. It was not until the
first free elections in 1994 that efforts were commenced in earnest by
the new administration to assure and protect those civil liberties.
The campaign for the new government of national unit) and the
L " See i&
M Id.
.. See i
Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
'
5 3 d.
'60 d.
... See i& at 409.
" See David van Wyk, Introductions to the South African Constatnon, in RIGTIS D
CoNsrrrunIoNAuisM: THE NEv SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 131. 137 (David %an )k ct al.
eds., 1995) (arguing that South Africa began the journey towards abolishing aparthod in 1990
when F.W. de Kierk addressed the Parliament with practical steps to negotiate a political settle-
ment in the country). South Africa scheduled its first free and incusive elections for April 27,
1994. See id at 141.
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authority of the interim constitution had begun as millions of people
who had suffered the indignities of the bantustan system cried out for
basic improvements to their quality of life, such as potable water, de-
cent housing, and electricity. 63 Although relief was slow in coming,
the constitutional education and participation programs ran strong.
These programs taught people about the IC and asked for their input
and participation in writing the Constitution.'6 By mid-1994, people
had begun to exercise their new rights-demonstrating against dis-
crimination, demanding better housing and striking for better wages,
work conditions, and health benefits&9 In manifestations both mod-
erate and extreme, the era of constitutional rights was born in South
Africa. However, the public remained concerned about the institu-
tions charged with preserving their hard-earned rights.
The decision to create the CCT, rather than grant jurisdiction
over constitutional issues to the Supreme Court, was a conscious one
reflecting the desire to provide a new forum for the protection of
human rights untainted by the past participation of the judiciary in
the enforcement of apartheid.'6 The Justices of the Court, conscious
of the Court's special role and new roots, voted to reinforce the per-
ception of newjudicial autonomy and South African unity by decorat-
ing the Court with artwork representing South Africa's multi-cultural
society and by electing to wear green robes instead of the traditional
black. Following this same theme, the symbol of the CCT is the Afri-
can tree of justice, under which tribal disputes are traditionally set-
tled. The shape of the tree's branches reflects the pattern of the new
flag as well as the shape of the horn of Africa. These symbolic
changes and the early success of the CCT bolstered public confidence
that an impartial institution would hear the pleas of the oppressed
and protect their rights. 7
Makwanyane, however, provided a special challenge because, as
... See NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM, 534-35 (1994) (stating that before the
April 27, 1994 elections, candidates participated in public conversations in an effort to gather
feedback on the interim constitution and support for democratic elections); see generally WEEKLY
MAIL & GuARDtAN, A-Z OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS (1995) 361-375 (providing a demographic
profile of South Africa's nine provinces). Laws concerning work permits, pass laws, and restric-
tive education policies were adopted and rigorously enforced with the segregation of South Af-
rican society and the creation of "independent" homelands for non-white South Africans. Such
"homelands" were eventually called bantustans. See MANDELA, supra, at 295.
'"SeeMANDELA, supra note 163, at 534.
See id. at 536 (stating that individuals who lived in territories that were not participating
in the elections organized strikes and demonstrations to urge inclusion in the new democratic
state).
" See van Wyk, supra note 162, at 157, 168 (describing how the concerns of distinct parties
and the MPNP, the pre-democratic government which drafted the IC, led to a series of innova-
tive structures in the IC including a Constitutional Court distinct from the appellate division).
'67 Unfortunately, these expectations often did not include a deeper understanding of the
judicial process. On opening day, the new Court began receiving a steady stream of calls from
individuals anxious for assessments of their constitutional rights, settlements of their disputes
and court orders for the protection of their rights. Calls came in from attorneys, bailiffs, court
clerks, detainees, and even prisoners.
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mentioned above, public opinion favored the death penalty. Hun-
dreds of unsolicited letters and facsimile transmissions for and
against capital punishment arrived at the Court from the moment the
case was opened until well after the judgment was handed down.'
All the major newspapers stated their own positions on the issue and
carried articles, commentaries and editorials reflecting public senti-
ment on both sides of the issue. Some articles asked by what right an
unelected few dared render a decision on the issue.'" Other articles
called for a referendum. 70
The response of the Court, under the heading of "Public Opin-
ion," focused on Section 11(2) of the interim Constitution that pro-
vided the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.7' K.P.C.O. (Klaus) von Lieres und Wilkau
SC, then Attorney General, had argued that society determines what
is cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and that public opinion
.. See State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 471 (Kriegler, J., concurring) ('We were fa-
voured with literally thousands of pages of material in support of and opposed to the death
penalty, ranging from the religious, ethical, philosophical and ideological to te mathematical
and statistical."). Both congratulatory and condemnatory correspondence ns received after
the judgment was made public.
" See, eg., Winnie Graham, ed., Left=a" This Really is the Last Straw, STAR (South Africa).Junc
7, 1995 (stating that the CCT's opinion represented an autocratic decision of an elite few who
overruled the wishes of the majority). In fact, counsel for the respondent argued that. due to
the depth of public opinion on the matter, a ruling against capital punishment would run con-
trary to the constitutional principle of a majoritarian democracy. See Respondent's Heads of
Argument at 46-48, State v. Main, anyaneandAnotlhr, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
'- See, eg., ACDP Backs Calls for People to Decde, CrzfEN. June 20. 1995 (reporting that the
African Christian Democratic Party supported the call for a referendum); Capital Punuhmrm:
Le PeopleDecde, 'CrnzEN,June 20, 1995 (reporting the National Party call for referendum); NP
Referendum Call H)pociticab DP, CrzN,June 20, 1995 (reporting the Democratic Part opposi-
tion to the National Party position in favor of the referendum); Referendum on Death Penalty Call
'Cheap Political Move', CrnzEN,June 20, 1995 (reporting reactions to the National Party's call for
a referendum). But see Capital Punishment Referendum Ref.%t, Bus. D.A;June 20, 1995, at 2 (re-
porting the Justice Minister's decision to reject requests for a referendum).
' See Makivanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 409 (discussing the application of Section 11 (2) of te
IC). Section 11 of the IC, entitled "Freedom and security of the person," stated:
(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom and security of the
person, which shall include the right not to be detained without trial.
(2) No person shall be subject to torture of any kind, whether ph)sical,
mental or emotional, nor shall any person be subject to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
S. AfR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 11. The new Constitution's Bill of Rights contains a
similar protection in Section 12. SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 12. Section 12 states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person.
which includes the right -
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or withoutjust cause;
(b) not to be detained without trial;
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or pri-
vate sources;
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing way.
Fall 1998]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
polls indicated overwhelming support for capital punishment and,
therefore, society did not consider the punishment to fall within the
definitions of cruel, inhuman or degrading.172  Although brief, the
poignancy of the Court's response is undeniable. Justice Chaskalson
observed:
Public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry,
but, in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the
Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provi-
sions without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be
decisive, there would be no need for constitutional adjudi-
cation. The protection of rights could then be left to Par-
liament, which has a mandate from the public, and is an-
swerable to the public for the way its mandate is exercised,
but this would be a return to parliamentary sovereignty, and
a retreat from the new legal order established by the 1993
Constitution. By the same token the issue of the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment cannot be referred to a ref-
erendum, in which a majority view would prevail over the
wishes of any minority. The very reason for establishing the
new legal order, and for vesting the power ofjudicial review
of all legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of
minorities and others who cannot protect their rights ade-
quately through the democratic process. Those who are en-
titled to claim this protection include the social outcasts
and marginalised people of our society. It is only if there is
a willingness to protect the worst and the weakest amongst
us that all of us can be secure that our own rights will be
protected. 173
He reinforced his conclusion with the timeless words of Justice Jack-
son, who affirmed the counter-majoritarian purpose of the Bill of
Rights in the United States Constitution:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections.174
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 410 (discussing the Attorney General's argument in
favor of the death penalty). The Attorney General's office operates independently from the
national government. While the Attorney General argued in favor of retaining the death pen-
alty, counsel for the national government, the well-respected Advocate George Bizos, argued
against it. See id. at 404; id. at 484 (Madula,J., concurring).
" Id. at 431.
174 See id. at 432 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 625, 638 (1943)).
Interestingly, as noted by Justice Chaskalson in Makwanyane, the Tanzanian Court of Appeal
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These eloquent statements unfortunately did not quell the public
outcry that followed the decision. It is doubtful, given the strength of
emotions surrounding this issue, that the Court's position would have
met with broad understanding even if they had been appropriately
excerpted by the media. Nevertheless, death row was emptied and its
former occupants were eventually re-sentenced in accordance with
the order of the Court.m The call for a referendum, championed by
the historically challenged National Party, failed." 6  Makwanyane,
South Africa's Marbury v. Madison, succeeded in establishing the pri-
macy of the Court's constitutional interpretations over the legislative
powers of Parliament.
D. Clarfication of the Interpretive Approach
Justice Chaskalson recognized with approval the Court's adoption
in Zuma of a modified generous approach to interpretation and pro-
vided additional clarification of that approach.'" He re-emphasized
the passage from Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.," first quoted in
Zuma by ActingJustice Kentridge, which states:
The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the
Charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of
such a guarantee; it was to be understood, in other words,
in the light of the interests it was meant to protect.
In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken, and the
purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought
by reference to the character and larger objects of the [Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms] itself, to the lan-
guage chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to
the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and where
applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other spe-
cific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within
the text of the Charter. The interpretation should be... a
generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the
purpose of a guarantee and securing for individuals the full
benefit of the Charter's protection."'
The theoretical difficulty arises during instances in which the gener-
ous and purposive approaches conflict, rather than complement each
reached the opposite conclusion in Mbushuu and Another v. 77te Rpublir Criminal Appeal No.
142 of 1994 (Jan. 30, 1995) on this issue just six months before Alaakwanyane ,as decided. The
Tanzanian court held it is for society and not the Courts to determine whether capital punish-
ment is necessary. See id.
' See id. at 452-53.
' See CapitalPunishment Referendum Refused, supra note 170. at 2 (reporting the Justice Min-
ister's decision to reject requests for a referendum).
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 403.
18 D.LR. (4th) 321, 359-60 (1985).
See Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 651.
' Makwanyan4 1995 (3) SALR at 403.
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other. Depending on the facts of each case, a conflict between the
two approaches may occur where a teleological interpretation of the
purpose of a constitutional provision requires a restrictive interpreta-
tion of the right in question. In such a situation, the purpose of the
right in question may demand that a generous approach to the inter-
pretation of that right be moderated.''
In Makwanyane, Justice O'Regan's concurring opinion provided
additional clarification on this potential theoretical conflict.
In giving meaning to [the right to life], we must seek the
purpose for which it was included in the Constitution. This
purposive or teleological approach to the interpretation of
rights may at times require a generous meaning to be given
to provisions of chapter 3 of the Constitution and at other
times a narrower or specific meaning. It is the responsibility of
the courts, and ultimately this Court, to develop fully the rights en-
trenched in the Constitution. But that will take time. Consequently
any minimum content which is attributed to a right may in subse-
quent cases be expanded and developed.
82
In so advocating incrementalism, her opinion also wisely provided
the South African judiciary with additional clarity on the task of con-
stitutional review.
Before the passage of the IC, the judiciary and the bar were accus-
tomed to parliamentary sovereignty and a legal regime that was, and
remains today, a curious mixture of English common law and Dutch
civil law. Prior to 1993, the content and character of rights were rela-
tively known quantities in South Africa, just as rights in the United
States are today. Not only did the IC replace those pre-1993 rights,
but also in many instances it raised certain long-standing rules of
statutory, administrative or common law to the status of constitu-
tional law and required such rules to be understood and interpreted
in a new way. '83 As such, these first arguments before the Court were
lengthy in their numerous requests for clarification. The Justices al-
lowed all parties more than their share of time allotted to canvass
their ideas, while at the same time patiently responding to and vigor-
ously, though politely, questioning counsel. By painstakingly address-
ing even seemingly inconsequential arguments, the Court may have
... For example, a generous interpretation of a typical "right to life" clause would not permit
a court to extend the interpretation of that right to a supercomputer with artificial intelligence
because the purpose of the typical "right to life" clause is clearly not the protection of inanimate
objects.
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 506 (emphasis added).
For example, in Makwanyane, the Attorney General argued that to interpret the right to
life as excluding the possibility of the death penalty would take away the power of the South
African Police Service to shoot to kill in order to affect arrest (something permitted under Sec-
tion 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act), as well as the right of the average citizen to kill in
self defense or the right of a soldier to kill in defense of his country. The Court patiently re-
sponded to those arguments. See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 448.
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stemmed judicial angst.'
Given the importance of the issues involved and the strength of
commitment to them felt by each of the Justices, the Court presented
eleven separate opinions, ten of them broadly concurring withJustice
Chaskalson.1ss There was unanimous agreement with the order of the
Court, and a majority agreed with the reasons given by President
Chaskalson for the violation of Section 11 (2).'r However, a plurality
emphasized the violation of the right to life protected by Section 9 as
being more fundamentally important to their analysis than the %iola-
tion of Section 11(2)."7 Notwithstanding the results of the anal)sis,
however, the Justices employed a substantially similar methodology.
The common threads of constitutional analysis woven into the sepa-
rate opinions provides an excellent sampling of constitutional inter-
pretation by the CCT.
"' In time, however, the Court's mounting docket of cases forced it to adopt a stricter ad-
herence to the rules limiting the length of oral arguments.
" For descriptions of the opinions, se infra text accompanying notes 287-290.
.. Each of the justices, whether basing their analysis on Section 11(2) or on Section 9. re-
ferred favorably to the rationale adopted by Justice Chaskalson in respect of Section 11 (2).
Many, however, indicated a desire to place additional emphasis on one aspect or another of
Justice Chaskalson's reasoning. See i&L at 453 (Ackermann, J.. concurring) (emphasizing the
arbitrariness of the decision to impose the death penalty); id. at 484 (Madala, J., concurring)
(explaining that the death penalty was adverse to traditional African beliefs bemuse it elimi-
nated the possibility of rehabilitation); i. at 498 (Mokgoro.J., concurring) (emphasizing the
need for the South African court system to recognize that indigenous African values are not
always in conflict with the promotion of underlying values of an open and democratic society).
At the same time, however, these fourJustices expressly agreed with Chaskalson's reasoning and
conclusion under to Section 11 (2), and agreed with his order.
' This plurality consisted of Justices Didcott, Kriegler, Langa, Mahomed. O'Regan and
Sachs. TheseJustices indicated that the basis for their declaration of unconstitutionality %as the
right to life, with the offense to Section 11(2) serving as an ancillary violation. Ser id at 461
(Didcott,J., concurring); id. at 475 (KrieglerJ., concurring), id. at 478-79 (LangaJ., concur-
ring); id. at 487-88 (MahomedJ., concurring); id. at 504 (O'Regan, J., concurring); id. at 510-
11 (SachsJ, concurring). The holding of the plurality is unclear, however, bemuse all of the
Justices contributed in a different way to the debate surrounding this issue. Furthermore, the
right to life opinions are (a) more complex to analyze than the opinions stressing Section 11 (2)
because they tend not to flow from a step by step analysis, due largely to their interdependence
with regard to and in support of the Court's methodology appearing in the Chaskalson judg-
ment, and (b) do not establish a plurality of the Court with regard to the content of the right to
life in this context. I note as an exception to (a) above the cogent opinion ofJustice O'Regan
on point and commend it to the reader. See infra note 256, at 504.
Additional reasons contribute to the prominence of the Section 11 (2) and Section 9 analy.
sis here in spite of the six to five plurality favoring the right to life rationale. For instanceJus-
tice Chaskalson'sjudgment appears to have been intended by the CCT to be the most complete
analysis. The other opinions, appearing alphabetically thereafter, imported or referenced sec-
tions ofJustice Chaskalson's analysis, and developed additional and alternative points of em-
phasis. Secondly, as a result of (b) there is no authoritative statement of the Court to be
gleaned from the right to life opinions. Their agreement only supports a proposition that the
death penalty violates the right to life. There was not a plurality on the exact basis of the viola-
tion of the right to life because the opinions do not adopt a common position on the content of
the right to life in this context. This does not mean that the holding of the Court must be un-
derstood as declaring the death penalty to be an unconstitutional violation of the Section 9
right to life as well as, with respect to Section 11 (2), an unconstitutional imposition of cruel.
inhuman and degrading punishment.
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E. Section 35: Combining Method and Mandate
Makwanyane improved on the analysis in Zuma by making ample
use of international law as well as foreign comparative law, while also
noting the discretionary nature of Section 35 .'88 Explicitly acknowl-
edging Section 35's requirement that the CCT look to foreign and
international law when interpreting Chapter 3 rights, Justice Chaskal-
son first conceded that "[c] aital punishment is not prohibited by
public international law...."' He then proceeded carefully to dis-
tinguish the language used in those international instruments and
foreign constitutions that permits capital punishment from the lan-
guage in the text of the IC.'90 He commented that "[i]nternational
human rights agreements differ, however, from our Constitution in
that where the right to life is expressed in unqualified terms they ei-
ther deal specifically with the death sentence, or authorizes excep-
tions to be made to the right to life by law,"' 9' and referenced the dis-
cretion of the Court in this regard. Justice Chaskalson continued,
"[a] Ithough we are told by section 35(1) that we 'may' have regard to
foreign case law, it is important to appreciate that this will not neces-
sarily offer a safe guide to the interpretation of Chapter 3 of our Con-
stitution., 92 In doing so, he reiterated Zuma's cautionary stance that
it is possible to respect the mandate of Section 35 without slavishly
following international or foreign comparative jurisprudence.'" In
this instance, as in Zuma, the Court drew a textual distinction be-
tween the language of the IC and the language used in other jurisdic-
tions. Again, under the two-stage analysis called for by the IC and the
new Constitution, the Court is bound first to determine if the right in
question has been violated and then to evaluate the constitutionality
of the violation in terms of the limitations clause.
194
As in Zuma, the Court in Makwanyane surveyed international and
foreign comparative jurisprudence to give content to the rights pro-
vided in Section 11 (2).9-5 However, Makwanyane expanded the analy-
sis to include public international law and a wider range of foreign
'* See id. at 413-14.
" Id. at 414.
See i& at 415.
... Id. at 414 (citing Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) of 1966, Article 4(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Article 4 of the African Charter of Human and
People's Rights, each of which either directly sanction capital punishment or provide for a
qualified right to life by stating essentially that no person shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to life).
Id. (citing Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR 642 (CC)).
The nature of this judicial discretion is explored in Section IV which considers the CCT's
determination that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is not unconstitutional. See infra
Section IV.
' See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 415.
1 See id.
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jurisdictions. 99 Even so, constitutional comparisons are complicated
by the subjective nature of the foreign instruments. It is, therefore,
often necessary for the analyst to obtain an in-depth knowledge as
well as an historical and jurisprudential perspective on the treatment
of a particular constitutional issue under the foreign instrumenL'9
Highlighting one example of such a difficulty, Justice Chaskalson re-
marked:
The United States jurisprudence has not resolved the di-
lemma arising from the fact that the constitution prohibits
cruel and unusual punishments, but also permits and con-
templates that there will be capital punishment. The accep-
tance by a majority of the United States Supreme Court of
the proposition that capital punishment is not per se uncon-
stitutional, but that in certain circumstances it may be arbi-
trary and thus unconstitutional, has led to endless litiga-
tion .... The difficulties that have been experienced in
following this path, to which Justice Blackmun and Justice
Scalia have both referred, but from which they have drawn
different conclusions, persuade me that we should not fol-
low this route.!"
Specifically, the problem with the United States Constitution as a ba-
sis for comparative analysis is that its structure inhibits the first stage
of the comparison.!
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments in the United States.an The Fifth Amendment states that " [n] o
person shall be held to answer for a capita4 or othenvise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury..."
and "nor shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." ' The decision by the drafters of the
United States Constitution to prohibit "cruel and unusual punish-
" See id. at 413 (explaining that "international and foreign authorities are of value becamuse
they analyse arguments for and against the death sentence").
"9See id. at 415 (noting that the Court is "required to construe the South African Constitu-
don, and not an international instrument or the constitution ofsome foreign country").
SId. at 422 (citations omitted). justice Chaskalson noted with understanding the difficul-
ties outlined injustice Blackmun's famous dissent in Caolins z. Cdl/ins 510 U.S. 1141 (1994),
concerning the United States' inability to balance the need for individualized consideration in
criminal punishment, including capital sentencing, with the need for a non-arbitrary (standard-
ized) system of capital punishment. A movement tou-ard one is a movement ama)y from the
other. See id. at 1144-45 (arguing that the United States Supreme Court has conceded that
"fairness and rationality cannot be achieved in the administration of the death penalty').
See Malwanyane 1995(3) SALR at 435 (pointing out that the United States Constitution,
unlike the South African Constitution, lacks a limitation clause).
' "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. The relevant portion of the Fourteenth
Amendment states: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
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ment" while at the same time adopting a permissive stance toward
capital punishment implies that the drafters did not believe that capi-
tal punishment was per se cruel and unusual punishment when carried
out following the "presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury" and in
accordance with "due process of law."20 2  In Justice Chaskalson's
analysis, the IC and United States Constitution's different language
merits that each Constitution receive a different analysis. 205 Even so,
elements of the United States Supreme Court's analysis, especially as
they relate to the impropriety of arbitrariness and inequality in the
imposition of the punishment, proved informative to the analysis of
the IC provisions.
Justice Chaskalson also noted that the language of the Indian
Constitution creates the same dilemma as the language in the United
States Constitution.205 The leading case then on point, Bachan Singh• 206
v. State of Punjab, reached a conclusion similar to that in Gregg v.
Georgia. 0  Again, Chaskalson found that such a conclusion is not
supported by the language of the IC.2
0
1
Justice Chaskalson also noted that the imposition of the death
penalty, though permitted by the terms of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, 209 and the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
210
could, in specific instances, be considered cruel and unusual pun-
ishments under those same instruments. 21' Justice Chaskalson fo-
See Makwanyane, 1995(3) SALR at 415 (noting that the United States Constitution recog-
nized capital punishment as lawful from its beginnings). However, this does not diminish the
very real reflection in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 84 (1958), that the Eighth Amendment "is not
static" and that it "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Trap, 356 U.S. at 101. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment states
that capital punishment must be permitted, only that it may. See U.S. CONST. amend V. As with
other forms of punishment now deemed cruel and unusual, it is still possible for a court to de-
termine that capital punishment is cruel and unusual punishment.
2' See Makwanyane, 1995(3) SALR at 435 (explaining that the South African Constitution is
different from the United States' in that the United States Constitution does not have a limita-
tions clause, thus forcing courts to find limits to constitutional rights through a narrow inter-
pretation of the rights themselves).
See id. at 417-21.
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution states, "No person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." INDIA CONST. art. 21 (emphasis
added).
(1980) 2 S.C.C. 684, 709 (holding that the imposition of the death penalty was constitu-
tional despite a constitutional guarantee of the right to life).
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that the death sentence is not perse cruel and unusual pun-
ishment).
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 428 (pointing out that the wording of the South Afri-
can Constitution frames the analysis differently than the United States or Indian Constitutions).
' See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adpted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 6, 999
U.N.T.S.
' See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
2 See id. at 424-26 (noting that these instruments tolerate, but do not attempt to justify, the
death penalty).
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cused on three international tribunal cases involving claims for
American extradition requests for persons charged with capital
crimes in the United States.12 In all of the cases, the accused alleged
that extradition to the United States would potentially subject them
to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of the appli-
cable international instrument. s- In two of the three cases, the claim
was deemed meritorious and the denial of extradition wras upheld
based on the cruel, inhuman and degrading nature of the potential
sentence of death.2 4
Justice Chaskalson, in concluding the analysis of the first stage of
the Court's approach, found that capital punishment violated Section
11(2) 25 Although he guided the reader directly to the analysis of the
limitations clause of Section 33, the two-stage analysis is somewhat
paradoxical.2 6 How can a judge find that a punishment is cruel, in-
human and degrading in stage one, and still question whether the
punishment is constitutional under the criteria set out in the limita-
tions clause? Does not the first conclusion imply automatic failure to
meet the saving provisions of Section 33? Although this would un-
doubtedly be the case under a one-stage approach of American con-
stitutional interpretation, 7 it does not need to be the case under the
two-stage approach of the 1C.218 Once the violation is established, the
limitations clause requires the Court to determine whether the viola-
tion is nevertheless reasonable or justifiable, whether it negates the
essential content of the right and, in the case of Section 11(2),
219whether it is necessary.
As in the Court's expanded use of public international law, the
limitations clause analysis in Makwanyane represented a significant re-
finement over the analysis in Zuma- Nevertheless, the two decisions
share similar points in their analyses. For example, the two shared a
" See id. at 423-26 (discussing Ng. v. Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.. 49th Sess.,
No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1994) (holding in fivor of extradition):
Kindler v. Canada [1992] 6 S.C.R1 (2d) 193 (holding in favor of extradition); Soering v. United
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R_ (Ser. A) at 8 (1989) (holding against extradition).
2 See id. at 424.
14 The holding in Ngwas in part based on the use of a gas chamber to execute the defen-
dant. See id (explaining that the Ng court concluded that a country %as not precluded from
permitting extradition to a country that might enforce the death penalty but finding that the
method here was unduly cruel and therefore holding against extradition). In S,-ing, the deci-
sion was based in part on the "death row phenomenon" relating to the mental and emotional
anguish linked to the lengthy detention and other conditions surrounding imprisonment on
death row. See Soeming 161 Eur. Ct. MR. at 36-45.
" See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 433-34 ('I am satisfied that in the context of our Con-
stitution the death penalty is indeed cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.").
... See id. at 435.
2' See id. (discussing how the lack of a limitations clause in the Unites States Constitution
forces the U.S. courts to interpret fundamental rights narrowly).
2' See id. at 435 (stating that under a two-stage approach, the question is notjust if a law is
constitutional, but also whether the law isjustifiable).
219 See id.
' See supra text accompanying note 196.
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continued reference to American jurisprudence for insights into
rights analysis despite the noted difference in U.S constitutional ap-
proach and structure.221 The depth of U.S. constitutional jurispru-
dence is a result of the lengthy treatment the judiciary in the United
States has given to even the smallest elements of rights analysis. Fur-
ther, both analyses also shared a preference for Canadian constitu-
tional law. This preference was understandable in light of the simi-
larities in structure between the Canadian Constitution and the IC,
notably their similar limitations clauseY2 Two additional factors
weigh in favor of a South African preference for Canadian jurispru-
dence. The Canadian Constitution was written more recently. Also,
Canadian society has had to accommodate a multiplicity of ethnic
minorities as well as the ancillary complexities associated with being a
multilingual and multicultural society.
The Makwanyane judgment essentially distilled the limitations
clause into its core elements. Here again, the Court turned to trans-
national sources for guidance. In Makwanyane, the CCT surveyed the
interpretive techniques of the Canadian, German and European
Court of Human Rights and found that limitations analysis typically
consists of some form of a balancing test by which the courts review
the means and ends of the offending legislation.ns Again, the South
African Court favored the Canadian court's method and its three-
prong proportionality test developed in Regina v. Oakes.
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to
achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbi-
trary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short,
they must be rationally connected to the [legislative] objec-
tive. Secondly, the means, even if rationally connected to
the objective in the first sense, should impair 'as little as
possible' the right or freedom in question. Thirdly, there
must be a proportionality between the effects of the meas-
ures which are responsible for limiting the charter right or
freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of
'sufficient importance.'2 4
Justice Chaskalson went so far as to lay out the potential application
of this specific test to the question before the Courty Nevertheless,
due to the textual differences between the Canadian Charter of
Rights and the IC's Chapter 3 on Fundamental Rights, the Oakes test
was not adopted outright.2
6
.' See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 415; Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 653.
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 436-38; Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 656 ("Accordingly, I
consider that we may appropriately apply the principles worked out by the Canadian Supreme
Court....").
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 436-39.
See id. at 437 (quoting Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. at 337).
See id. at 437-38.
See id. at 439 (citing Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 642).
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The Court then noted that the German Federal Constitutional
Court and European Court of Human Rights also employ balancing
tests.27 Interpretation of offending legislation in terms of the Ger-
man limitations provisions is also based on proportionality, as it was
in the rights analysis under Oakes.2s Even so, for textual reasons simi-
lar to those raised with regard to the Canadian approach in Oakes,
Justice Chaskalson expressed certain misgivings regarding the Ger-
man approach as well. Likewise, Justice Chaskalson found the use
of the proportionality test by the European Court to be tainted by the
fact that the European Court is obliged to accommodate the sover-
eignty of it member states.' Sovereignty is accommodated through
the "margin of appreciation" which is broader or narrower, depend-
ing on the right that is being infringed upon.2 ' Under this doctrine,
greater deference is granted by the European Court to rights viola-
tions in areas of social policy and lesser deference in areas of funda-
mental rights.ss Although recognizing the European Court's posi-
tion as one of necessary compromise, Justice Chaskalson did not find
the CCT to be similarly constrained.s
Having heeded Section 35's mandate by canvassing a variety of
sources, Justice Chaskalson then refocused on the limitations clause
of the IC. At this point, it might be helpful to retrace the first step of
limitations clause analysis. As stated above, Section 33(1) (a) calls for
any limitation to be found (i) reasonable and (ii) justifiable.3 Prior
to addressing the Canadian, German and European Court rationales,
Justice Chaskalson indicated that "[t]he limitation of constitutional
right for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic
society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately
an assessment based on proportionality."2 Justice Chaskalson in-
cluded both criteria in the balancing (or proportionality) test he ap-
- See id. at 438-39.
' See id at 438 (discussing Articles 18 and 19 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of
Germany of May 23, 1949, as amended).
See id. (noting that the German Court relies on the extreme limitations of the propor-
tionality test).
See id at 439. Justice Chaskalson wrote:
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights provides some
guidance as to what may be considered necessary in a democratic society,
but the margin of appreciation allowed to national authorities by the
European Court must be understood as finding its place in an intera-
tional agreement which has to accommodate the sovereignty of the mem-
ber states. It is not necessarily a safe guide as to what would be appropriate
under [section] 33 of our Constitution.
Id.
'See i&.
' See i& at 438-39.
See i&t
See supra text accompanying note 92.
See Makivanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 436.
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plied.
In applying this test, Justice Chaskalson first turned to the key Sec-
tion 33 (1) (a) arguments before the Court.3,7 The reasonableness and
justification of the death penalty were argued on penological theories
of deterrence, prevention and retribution.28 The state's statistical ar-
gument that the death penalty provides for greater deterrence was
deemed to lack sufficient evidentiary support. The Court did not
find the respondent's argument that capital punishment prevents re-
cidivism particularly compelling because the Court reasoned that the
alternative of life imprisonment would have the same result.40
Theories of deterrence and prevention aside, the Court's analysis
of the respondent's argument that capital punishment is an expres-
sion of legitimate societal outrage and desire for retribution provides
the most interesting and revealing commentary. As Justice Chaskal-
son wrote:
Retribution is one of the objects of punishment, but it car-
res less weight than deterrence. The righteous anger of
family and friends of the murder victim, reinforced by the
public abhorrence of vile crimes, is easily translated in to a
call for vengeance. But capital punishment is not the only
way that society has of expressing its moral outrage at the
In the text, Justice Chaskalson referred more often to the term "justifiability" than rea-
sonableness. Chaskalson, however, apparently used "justifiability" to signify the combination of
reasonable and justifiable. Similarly, Justice O'Regan treats Section 33(a) (i) (reasonableness)
and (a) (ii) (justifiability) as one test. See id. at 339 (O'Regan, J., concurring). Interestingly,
Justice Kriegler indicated that some distinction may exist between reasonable and justifiable,
writing, "As I am satisfied that section 277(1) (a) does not meet the threshold test of reason-
ableness, I find it unnecessary to ask whether it is justifiable." Id. at 477 (Kreigler, J., concur-
ring). Even so, in a footnote he explicitly raises the question of whether or not a distinction
between the two can be effectively drawn. See id. at 477 n.8. Justice Langa agrees that the death
penalty is unreasonable, deeming it unnecessary to further address justifiability. See id. at 479
(Langa, J., concurring). On the other hand, Justice Mahomed's analysis reached the conclu-
sion that the death penalty was not justifiable in an open and democratic society. See id. at 497.
This conclusion obviated the need to address the other components of Section 33. This poten-
tial distinction was not addressed by the other Justices, who also subscribed to a balancing ap-
proach, whether or not they place their emphasis on Section 11(2) or Section 9. See, e.g., id. at
499 (MokgoroJ., concurring).
" See Makwanyane 1995 (3) SALR at 436. The Court reserved the issues of "essential con-
tent" and self-defense for later discussion. See id. at 446-51; see also S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC),
ch. 2, § 33(b).
See id. at 441-46.
See id. at 443. Current and historical evidence provided by the Commissioner of Police,
as amicus curiae, did not support the respondent's contentions that the murder rate had in-
creased since the 1992 moratorium of death penalty sentences. In fact, statistical analysis con-
ducted by Justice Didcott found that the murder rate prior to the moratorium was not effected
by the announcement of the moratorium. See id. at 465-66 (DidcottJ., concurring). In fairness
to the respondent, however, it is impossible to show that the death penalty provides no deter-
rent at all because there is no reliable means of calculating how many murders were not com-
mitted because of the death penalty. See id.
2 See id. at 443-44. It was, however, argued that capital punishment is an effective specific
deterrent to prevent prison crimes by the particular individual over the course of their impris-
onment.
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crime that has been committed. We have long outgrown
the literal application of the biblical injunction of, 'an eye
for and eye, and a tooth for a tooth.' Punishment must to
some extent be commensurate with the offence, but there is
no requirement that it be equivalent or identical to it.2
"
Justice Chaskalson recalled that free and democratic societies do
not inflict upon violent criminals the same violence criminals inflict
on others. 24 Even more importantly, however, Justice Chaskalson ac-
knowledged that the interim Constitution recognized the horrific
past of South African law enforcement and the objective of the IC to
create a state founded on respect for human rights by citing the con-
cluding provision, or epilogue, of the IC.
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foun-
dation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divi-
sions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations
of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian princi-
ples in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt
and revenge.
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a
need for understanding but not for vengeance a need for
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubunt "' but not
for victimisation.
2"
Id. at 445-46 (footnote omitted).
"2 See id. at 413.
" The concept of ubuntu is emphasized in the concurring opinions of Justices Langa,
Madala and Mokgoro and relates to a spirit of community and to the 'interdependence of
members of a community." Id. at 481 (Langa, J., concurring); see also id. at 485 (Madala. J.,
concurring); id. at 501 (MokgoroJ., concurring).
'" See id. at 446 (quoting the final provision of the interim Constitution entitled 'National
Unity and Reconciliation."); see also S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC) ('National Unity and Recon-
ciliation); see infra text accompanying notes 385. This statement, and its analysis by the Court in
both Makwanyane and AZAPO, are clear examples of the -redemptive ste' to which Bruce Ack-
erman has referred. See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Cons tiutionalism, 83 U. V. L REV.
771 (1997). In the context of Ackerman's analysis of the styles reflected in many of the neer
constitutions, a strong argument can be made that both the IC and the new Constitution follow
the "new beginnings" scenario he describes. Cf. id. at 795-96. Under this scenario, he asserted,
"The court[s] seek to demonstrate that the solemn commitments made by the People in their
constitution are not merely paper promises that can be conveniently pushed to one side by
those in power. Given this aspiration, the redemptive Court is not embarrassed by the need to
state broad constitutional principles and to vindicate them in wiays that ordinary men and
women ill appreciate." Id. at 795.
I find this statement fitting to the interpretive style of the Court. I also note tith regard to
that analysis that, although it may be the case that the juxtaposition of a charismatic president
and an independent legislature can engender institutional conflict, due to the harmony be-
tween the ANC-dominated national legislature and President Mandela, this has been avoided at
the national level in South Africa. However, provincial/national and provincial/executive dis-
putes have been more frequent, especially concerning those provinces controlled by parties
other than the ANC. See Western Cape v. Preident, 1995 (4) SALR 887 (CC); In re K%=zulu-Nata
Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Amendment Bill 1995; In re Payment of Salaries, Allowances and
Other Privileges to the Ingonyama Amendment Bill of 1995, 1996 (4) SALR 653 (CC). Al-
though South Africa is technically not a federal state, the Court has cautiously approached the
resolution of these constitutional boundary disputes, by adopting a more distinctive coordinat-
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Justice Chaskalson found that, in light of this clear statement of con-
stitutional priority, it was inappropriate to give undue weight to retri-
bution in the Court's analysis.
Two additional components of the analysis of constitutional rights
under Section 33 are also addressed in Makwanyane--the require-
ment in Section 33(1) (b) that a limitation to a fundamental right not"negate the essential content of the right" and the requirement of
necessity in Section 33 (aa) .246 The first of these components posed a
difficult theoretical problem for the Court: what is the "essential con-
tent" of a right? Again, the Court found reference to foreign juris-
prudence useful.
Although similar injunctions exist in a few other constitutions
around the world, there is little helpful jurisprudence on point indi-
cating a clear path for judicial interpretation. Not only is there a
paucity of international and foreign comparative guidance, 249 there is
also a potential theoretical conflict which arises in the analysis. For
example, if the "essential content" of the right to dignity is viewed
subjectively as the right of each individual to have his or her own dig-
nity respected, then the death penalty could be interpreted as negat-
ing the "essential content" of the right.3 0 However, if it is viewed ob-
jectively as, for example, the right of all citizens to have their dignity
respected, then depriving the criminal of his or her dignity may not
negate the 'essential content' of the right.2" All of the Justices ad-
dressing the issue voiced similar consternation over the interpreta-
tion of Section 33 (1) (b) 22 It is of no surprise that the "essential con-
tent" component of the limitations clause does not appear in Section
ing style" to its reasoning. See Ackerman, supra, at 795-96 (supporting Ackerman's hypothesis
regarding possible mixed approaches).
' See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 446.
' See id. at 43646.
2" see id.
2,, See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 446-47 (Chasklason,J., concuring) (discussing the lack
of usefuljurisprudence).
'0 For example, although the German Constitution is one of the sources of this concept,
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has not been successful in providing it meaning.
See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 306 (1994).
See Makwanyane 1995 (3) SALR at 447 (Chaskalson,J., concurring).
See id. (Chaskalson,J., concurring). In interpreting these clauses, it is important to avoid
the tautological values debate and allow the examples to be taken at face value. While one
critic may argue that execution in the subjective approach may not negate the "essential con-
tent" of the individual right if they are allowed to "die with dignity," another may argue in re-
sponse to the objective approach that a death caused by the systematic operation of the state's
machinery diminishes the dignity of all. Although Justice Ackermann does not formally de-
velop an objective approach, he does indicate that he disagrees with this formulation. See id. at
458 (Ackermann,J., concurring). Justice Kentridge provides a more rigorous discussion of the
subjective versus objective approaches. See id. at 469-70 (Kentridge,J., concurring).
" See id. at 458 (Ackermann J., concurring); id. at 461 (DidcottJ., concurring); id. at 469-
70 (Kentridge,J., concurring); id. at 479 (Kriegler,J., concurring); id. at 479 (Langa,J., concur-
ring), id. at 497-98 (Mahomed,J., concurring); id. at 510 (O'Regan,J., concurring).
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36 of the new Constitution.25
In contrast, the requirement in Section 33(1) (aa) that a limitation
to a Section 11 right also be "necessary" is more manageable. '4 Nev-
ertheless, because all the Justices determined that. Section 277 of the
Criminal Procedure Act failed to meet the primary legs of the limita-
tions test, none of them definitively addressed what additional analy-
sis should be applied in instances where the requirement of "neces-
sity" is met.25 Justice O'Regan, eloquently summing up the Court's
methodology, came the closest to addressing how the Court might
factor "necessity" into its analysis.
The purpose of the bifurcated levels of justification need
not detain us here. What is clear is that section 33 intro-
duces different levels of scrutiny for laws which [sic) cause
an infringement of rights. The requirement of reasonable-
ness and justifiability which attaches to some of the section
33 rights clearly envisages a less stringent constitutional
standard than does the requirement of necessity. In both
cases, the enquiry concerns proportionality . to measure the
purpose, effects and importance of the infringing legisla-
tion against the infringement caused. In addition, it will
need to be shown that the ends sought by the legislation
cannot be achieved sufficiently and realistically by other
means which [sic] would be less destructive of entrenched
rights. Where the constitutional standard is necessity, the
considerations are similar, but the standard is more strin-
gent.'
This summarization also highlights an important distinction be-
tween the United States Constitution and its more modern counter-
parts. Not only do the more modern constitutions and international
treaties tend to contain limitations clauses more conducive to the
two-stage approach, they also reflect the efforts of newer constitu-
tional democracies to establish a variety of textual standards applica-
ble to rights analysis. In essence, the rational basis, mid-level and
strict scrutiny developed under common law in the United States
tend to be written directly into the limitations clauses of modern con-
stitutions whether adopted by common law or civil lawjurisdictions.
Section 33 (aa) exemplified this type of constitutional engineering
and it specifically listed those rights for which a limitation must be
One author notes that the new limitations clause, while curing certain old defecu, may
introduce new ones. See Smart Woolman, Out of order? Out of Balante? The Limitation Claue of
the Final Constitution, 13 S. AFRJ. HUM. RTs. 102, 105 (1997).
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 436.
See 1&. at 434-35; i&e at 458 (Ackerman, J., concurring); eL at 470 (KcntidgeJ., concur-
ring); id. at 483 (MfadalaJ., concurring); id. at 497 (Mahomed.J.. concurring): id. at 503 (Mok-
goro,J., concurring); i&. at 509 (O'Regan,J., concurring); id. at 510 (Sacds,J., concurring).
ld& at 339.
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found to be necessary (strict scrutiny).257 Section 33 (bb) listed those
rights for which the necessity of the limitation must be determined
only in so far as the limitation related to "free and fair political activ-
ity. " 5s8 Thus, a limitation on the right to freedom of expression con-
tained in Section 15 of the IC,2 9 like limitations on the right to free
speech contained in the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, must be found to be reasonable and justifiable. To the
extent the restriction on freedom of expression relates to free and
fair political activity, it must also be necessary as in the U.S.2 61 Inter-
estingly, these particular attempts at jurisprudential engineering are
abandoned in the new Constitution.261 The approach in Section 36 of
the new Constitution, however, actually adopts the judicial analysis
outlined by the CCT in Makwanyane.263 The high level of precision
contained in Section 36 may prove problematic for the South African
courts, but only in the short-term.
Both the judicial and rights engineering evident in modem con-
stitutions clearly demonstrate an effort to benefit from local jurispru-
dence and international and foreign comparative jurisprudence. 2" A
two-stage interpretive process via a limitations clause certainly helps a
judiciary in the transition to constitutional democracy by articulating
the basic analytical propositions. The alternative, a less precise limi-
tations clause, would have forced South African courts to reinvent the
wheel of constitutional rights interpretation by muddling through the
"' See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 33(aa) ("[A] right entrenched in section 10, 11,
12, 14(1), 21, 25, or 30(l)(d) or (e) or (2).").
Id. at ch. 3, § 33(bb) (listing "right[s] entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24").
See id. at ch. 3, § 15 (providing the right to free speech and expression); see also infra note
264 (quoting the text of section 16 of the new Constitution which protects the right to free
speech and expression).
See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 698 (1978) (finding
an injunction against plaintiff's expression on bidding reasonable in light of plaintiff's violation
of the Sherman Act).
"' See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 4546 (1983) (applying
strict scrutiny to limitations of content-based freedom of expression).
"2 SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 36. The new provision does not even retain a discre-
tionary resort to necessity.
' It is useful to compare the text of Section 36, supra note 91, with Justice O'Regan's ex-
planation in Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 509 (O'Regan,J., concurring), quoted supra in text
accompanying note 256.
' The best example of this is the formulation of the new right to freedom of expression
contained in Section 16 of the new Constitution:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes -
(a) freedom of the press and other media;
(b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;
(c)freedom of artistic creativity; and
(d)academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.
(2)The right in subsection (1) does not extend to -
(a) propaganda for war; incitement of imminent violence; or
advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion,
and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 16.
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development of standards for constitutional analysis as courts in the
United States have done in the past. Rights engineering also provides
broad benefits by integrating judicial experience. For example, the
development over two centuries in the United States of administrative
due process jurisprudence is reflected in South Africa's new and me-
ticulously formulated right to "just administrative action" contained
in Section 33 of the new Constitution:
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by
administrative action has the right to be given wvritten rea-
sons.
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to
these rights, and must
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a
court or, where appropriate, an independent and impar-
tial tribunal;
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights
in subsections (1) and (2); and
(c) promote an efficient administration. -i
Thus, much of the work of judicial interpretation is either constitu-
tionally predetermined or the Constitution, itself, clearly indicates
the interpretive path. Nevertheless, the language is far from perfect
or unambiguous, as exemplified by subsection (c) above. As indi-
cated earlier, Makwanyane highlighted similar problems in regard to
Section 33 of the interim Constitution. The Court's difficulties in this
regard surely influenced the ongoing drafting process of the Consti-
tution.
F. Reflections on Makwanyane
Through a review of the most applicable foreign and international
legal models available, Justice Chaskalson offered insight into what
has become an important part of CCT practice. In Malknanyane, the
CCT examined the competing interpretive models for their strengths
and weaknesses. 2 6 The Court then settled on its own interpretive
methodology, which was grounded in the dictates of 
the 1C."'7
Through the Court's discussion, the reader gains an appreciation of
how the CCT's practice is not substantially different from that fol-
lowed by courts in other free and democratic nations and that, in cer-
tain respects, it may even represent an improvement on them. The
S. Ari. CONsT. of 1996, ch. 3, § 33.
See Makweanyan, 1995 (3) SALR at 413-41 (examining capital punishment in countries
such as the United States and India as well as considering the %iew of the United Nations).
See id. at 403 ("IT]he Constitution must not be construed in isolation, but in its context.
which includes the history and background to the adoption of the Constitution, other provi-
sions of the Constitutions and, in particular, the provisions of chapter 3 of hich it is part.'J.
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CCT's ultimate reasoning is tailored to the specific needs and objec-
tives of the new South African society, as reflected in the language of
the IC.268 Makwanyane ended capital punishment and established the
CCT's reeminence in constitutional interpretation over the Parlia-
ment.26P If that were the extent of Makwanyane's legacy, it certainly
would be more than enough to justify its historical significance.
However, Makwanyane not only ended capital punishment under the
IC, but also rendered impossible its reinstitution under the Constitu-
tion while it was still being drafted, in part due to the completeness of
its review of applicable transnational law.
When Makwanyane was decided, the Constitutional Assembly was
still working on the new Constitution. The Court's decisions were be-
ing heavily reported, usually incorrectly in the early days. Those in-
volved in the process closely reviewed the Court's decisions. As men-
tioned, there was talk of a referendum on capital punishment, as well
as the potential inclusion of explicit language in the new Constitu-
tion.2 Thus, the announcement of the decision in Makwanyane was
of great public moment. Those who supported the death penalty re-
viewed the decision to see if any interpretive "room" existed for a fu-
ture decision allowing capital punishment in certain circumstances.
The CCT could have decided Makwanyane in a manner that might
have allowed capital punishment to rise from the judicial ashes on ei-
ther of two bases: (a) the CCT could have subscribed to a prohibition
of the punishment under Section 11 (2) based on a holding that the
formalities and procedures associated with capital punishment-for ex-
ample, the conditions of detention in awaiting punishment or the ar-
bitrary or discriminatory system of arrest, trial and/or conviction-
constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, which would have
left open the same door as in Furman v. Georgia,27' or (b) the CCT, al-
though striking down capital punishment for other reasons, could
have indicated its support for an objective interpretation of the right
to life as the right of all citizens to enjoy life which arguably might
then not be negated by the fact that one citizen forfeited his or her
' See id. at 442 ("It is of fundamental importance to the future of our country that respect
for the law of our country should be restored, and the dangerous criminals should be appre-
hended and dealt with firmly... But the question is not whether criminals should go free and
be allowed to escape the consequences of their anti-social behavior. Clearly they should not;
and equally clearly those who engage in violent crime should be met with the full rigor of the
law. The question is whether the death sentence for murder can legitimately be made part of
that law. And this depends on whether it meets the criteria described by section 33(1).").
See id. at 452.
See supra text accompanying notes 168-176.
408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (holding a death penalty statute unconstitutional because it
lacked adequate procedural guidelines, producing arbitrary sentencing decisions). Four years
after the Supreme Court struck down a death penalty statute in Furman, it upheld a subsequent
death penalty statute that included procedural safeguards designed to cure the arbitrary impo-
sition of death sentences. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). Together, Furman
and Gregg demonstrate the problems created by invalidating capital punishment based on pro-
cedural, instead of substantive, grounds.
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life. When read carefully, it is apparent that Malkwanyane did not
leave room for a legislative revival of capital punishment on either
basis.
Although the analysis of the constitutionality of a particular pun-
ishment under Section 11(2) has a strong procedural component,
Justice Chaskalson also focused on the nature of the punishment it-
self.2 7 Under his analysis, a procedural review along the lines of
American due process jurisprudence was insufficient because it failed
to capture the totality of the offense affected by the punishment?"
We have to accept these differences in the ordinary criminal
cases that come before the courts, [because of arbitrariness
or bias] even to the extent that some may go to goal when
others similarly placed may be acquitted or receive non-
custodial senterices. But death is different, and the question
is whether this is acceptable when the difference is between
life and death. Unjust imprisonment is a great wrong, but if
it is discovered, the prisoner can be released and compen-
sated; but the killing of an innocent person is irremedi-
able .24
Justice Chaskalson effectively combined this statement on the totality
of death with the distinctions he found between the IC and interna-
tional and foreign constitutional texts to transcend the more typically
procedural tenor of death penalty analysis.-m Rather than overem-
phasizing the arbitrariness of the regulations governing the death
sentence, or the administrative and judicial procedures adopted to
accommodate it, Justice Chaskalson placed the enormity of the pun-
ishment in the context of its impact on a variety of rights, especially
the right to human dignity and the right to life."'r He held that the
death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment, not only because it
is a complete negation of human dignity and not only in the context
of an imperfect judicial system, but also because the absoluteness of
the death penalty negates any ability to later cure unavoidable biases
'See Makwvanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 409 ("It is also an inhuman punishment for it ... in-
volves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity,' and it is degrading be-
cause it strips the convicted person of all dignity and treats him or her as an object to be elimi-
nated by the State.") (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 290) (Brennan.J.. concurring)).
SSee id& Among others, Justice Didcott agreed with this point and he quoted a series of
court opinions describing the ordeal faced by a person on death row. Ste id. at 462.-64 (Didcott,
J., concurring) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 290-91, 306. People v. Anderson, 493 P. 2d 880.
894 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1972), Catholic Comm. forJustice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney Gen-
eral, Zimbabwe, and Others, 1993 (4) SA 239 (ZS).
' See id. at 420. The court also cited Suffolk v. Wltson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980). in which Chief
Justice Hennessy's plurality decision held capital punishment unconstitutional under the Nlas-
sachusetts State Constitution. See i. at 420 n.82.
See id. at 420-21 (discussing Furman).
See id. at 422, 429. The interim Constitution specifically provided for both the right to
life and the right to dignity. SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 9 ('Every person shall have
the right to life."); S. AFm. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 10 ("Every person shall have the respect
for and protection of his or her dignity.").
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and mistakes. 7 For all of these reasons, Justice Chaskalson argued
that the death penalty could not be deemed ajustifiable limitation on
the rights to dignity and life. 8 Understood in this light, Justice
Chaskalson reasoned that the procedural defects were unacceptable
because they are evidence of arbitrariness, inequality and bias and
because they are related to a more fundamental constitutional of-
fense: the dehumanization and indignity of state-supported, institu-
tionalized killing. 9
Under this rubric, Justice Chaskalson introduced the rights to life
and dignity as powerful examples of the broad constitutional impact
of the death penalty.28° As indicated above, these rights are treated as
informing the interpretation of Section 11 (2) .28' These rights also re-
inforced Justice Chaskalson's holding that the punishment itself is
constitutionally offensive and not only unconstitutional because of
the specific procedures by which that punishment is imposed 2  In so
holding, Justice Chaskalson closed the front door to legislative revival
that was left open in the United States by the rationale adopted in
Furman.285
The Makwanyanejudgment also attempted to close the back door
to the revival of capital punishment through the popular will by ren-
dering it almost impossible tojustify any reinstatement of capital pun-
ishment by constitutional amendment. Justice Chaskalson's rationale
contained two additional features that require review in this context.
First, by inextricably linking the violation of Section 11 (2) to capital
punishment's undeniable offense to Section 9, the right to life, and
Section 10, the right to human dignity, Chaskalson made it clear that
any potential revival of capital punishment would not only have to be
explicit, but that at least Sections 9, 10 and 11 also would have to be
rewritten in order to effectuate it.2 84 Second, by undermining the
reasons submitted in support of the death penalty, he indicated that
the constitutional structure itself may not tolerate capital punish-
ment.25 If no evidence conclusively supporting or refuting the deter-
rence theory existed when Makwanyane was decided, it is unlikely that
such evidence will appear later. Most important among the Court's
findings was that retribution, while an undeniable statement of hon-
est, human emotion, is not in keeping with the statement of National
"' See id. at 422-25, 451.
27 See id. at 451.
r See id. at 417-19.
See supra text accompanying note 173.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 11 (2).
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 451.
See 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972).
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 421-22, 429. It is worthy to note that any amendment
to Section 9's unqualified right to life permitting the taking of life by the state would have pit-
ted the strong anti-abortion movement against supporters of capital punishment.
mChaskalson argued that the statistics did not support the deterrence argument and that a
life sentence provided the same preventative effect. See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 439-51.
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Unity and Reconciliation.ua In fact, Justices Langa, Madala and Mok-
goro, among others, joined Justice Chaskalson in emphasizing that
the very future of South Africa depends on the abiding respect of all
South Africans for the tenets outlined within the statement. 7 AMh-
wanyane made it clear that the statement of National Unity and Rec-
onciliation would also have to be fundamentally altered or entirely
deleted if capital punishment were to be reinstated.
The concurring Justices who emphasized the right to life as the
primary consideration in their analysis provided one key point of ad-
ditional reasoning that would also complicate the task of any would-
be revivalists. It should not be overlooked that the majority of the
Justices of the Court severally held capital punishment to be an un-
constitutional violation of the right to life in the first instance, and
violation of the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, and de-
grading treatment in the second instance.2u All of the Justices com-
menting on the right to life, however, were keenly aware of the need
to restrict their interpretation in anticipation of future arguments
submitted in one of the abortion cases winding their wny through the
court system.
A majority of the Court, six Justices in total, indicated that the
right to life contains at a minimum the right not to be deliberately put
to death by the state.2 By so indicating, these Justices closed off an-
other potential avenue for the legislative resurrection of capital pun-
ishment: Section 33 could not be rewritten to make capital punish-
ment a permissible limitation on Section 9. As a result of the CCT's
interpretation, Section 9 would have to be revised to contain a quali-
fication in the first instance in order to permit capital punishment.
The Court exhaustively analyzed the practical, theoretical and
constitutional grounds for capital punishment and rejected them
This finding was strongly bolstered by the statements ofJustices Langa, Madala and Mok-
goro indicating that capital punishment is not in keeping uith ubunlu. Srr iurfra note 4298. Jus-
tice Sachs' concurring opinion provided additional support, brining an appreciation not only
notions of traditional African justice, but also an appreciation of African tradition and historical
context to the questions of life and punishment. See Makamnyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 513-21
(SachsJ., concurring).
See infra Section V, discussing the Court's response to challenge to the Truth and Rrcon-
ciliation Commission's right to grant amnesty.
See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 391.
See id. at 453 (Ackermann,J., concurring); id. at 461 (Didcott, J., concumng): id. at 475
(Kriegler, J., concurring); id. at 478 (Langa, J., concurring); id. at 487 (Mahomed. J.. concur-
ring); i&. at 570 (Sachs,J., concurring). This astute interpretation must be credited to Advocate
Wim Trengove, SC, who argued on behalf of the applicants. This interpretation constitutes nei-
ther a majority opinion nor a true plurality of the sixJustices favoring this interpretation. only
five actually based their decisions on analysis of the right to life. Justice Ackennann, although
basing his conclusion on his analysis of Section 11 (2), noted this interpretation with favor in his
opinion. See i&. at 458 (Ackermann,J., concurring). Justices Mokgoro and O'Regan adopted
broader views on the right to life. Justices Kentridge and Madala did not provide an anwbsis of
the right to life. Thus, only fourJustices ruling on the right to life adopted this interpretation.
They were joined by one, Justice Ackermann, whose remarks in this regard we-re not pertinent
to his conclusion. See id.
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leaving open only the unlikely but entirely plausible chance that: (i)
the Parliament would amend the IC, or (ii) the Constitutional As-
sembly drafting the new Constitution would reformulate the Bill of
Rights to accommodate capital punishment2 0 However, based on
Makwanyane, it was unlikely that any of these possibilities would sur-
vive review by the CCT. Under the interim Constitution, any further
reformation of Fundamental Rights was ultimately subject to review
by the CCT according to Constitutional Principle II.29' Furthermore,
the interim Constitution required that the CCT review any change in
the "Fundamental Rights" introduced by the new Constitution. 
2
Although the drafters of the new Constitution did not substan-
tively alter many of the core elements of the IC, such as the right to
dignity and the right to life,2 3 the drafters did modify the right to
"freedom and security of the person,"294 both to accommodate some
of the interpretive difficulties raised by the Court in Makwanyane and
to accommodate freedom of choice concerns.2  Furthermore, the
statement of National Unity and Reconciliation is no longer the epi-
logue to the Constitution, but it is imported into the new Constitu-
tion via Article 22 of Schedule 6, entitled "Transitional Arrange-
ments," for the specific purpose of maintaining constitutional
authority for the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act.26 Capital punishment has not been reinstated.
'"The abolition of the death penalty remained as a potential extension of the fight to life
even up to the circulation of the final draft of the Constitution. See Adrian Hadland, It's the Fi-
nal Draft of the Constitution But the BigDecisions Still Lie Ahead, SUNDAYINDEP., Nov. 26, 1995, at 7.
"Constitutional Principle II states:
Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms
and civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched
and justiciable provisions in the [new] Constitution, which shall be drafted af-
ter having given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained
in Chapter 3 of this Constitution.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), sched. 4, 11 (emphasis added).
'S eeS. AFR. CONST. of 1993, ch. 5, § 71 (granting the CCT authority to certify that the new
Constitution is in keeping with the Constitutional Principles negotiated at Kempton Park and
included as Schedule 4 of the IC).
' Cf S. ApR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 10 ("Every person shall have the right to respect
for and protection of his or her dignity.") with S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 10 ("Everyone
has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected."). Cf S. AFR.
CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 11 ("Every person shall have the right to life.") and S. AFR. CONST.
of 1996, ch. 2, § 11 ("Everyone has the right to life").
' See supra note 171 (comparing Section 12(1) of the new Constitution with Section 11 of
the IC).
See S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 12(2) (granting rights to reproductive and bodily in-
tegrity). Although the topic is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth pointing out that the
Constitution seems to anticipate ajudicial balancing of some sort to reconcile the meanings of
Section I l's unqualified right to life and Section 12 (2)'s statement that "Everyone has the right
to bodily integrity and psychological integrity, which shall include the right (a) to make deci-
sions concerning reproduction..." Id.
2 Article 22 of Schedule 6 states:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of the new Constitution and despite
the repeal of the previous Constitution, all the provisions relating to am-
nesty contained in the previous Constitution under the heading "National
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Although it may be too early to describe clear stages in the evolu-
tion of the CCT's jurisprudence, the Zuma and Maiwanyane decisions
were indicative of the judgments handed down in 1995. First, as for-
mative judgments, both decisions reflected the CCT's sincere con-
cern that it adequately covered all the appropriate theoretical and
practical legal issues. Both decisions also reflected the Court's desire
to ensure that the public understands its reasoning and that the lower
judiciary follows its reasoning. Procedural errors and mistakes by the
lower courts and by counsel were highlighted, but generally tolerated
in an attempt to consider the important issues. Second, Zuma and
Makwanyane illustrate the CCT's early focus on criminal justice. This
was a rational choice for the Constitutional Court because the system
of apartheid created a virtual police state legitimized by the judicial
enforcement of apartheid's laws and the acceptance of egregious be-
havior by the police, army and security officers. Although the actual
apartheid laws were repealed, either shortly before the adoption of the• - 297
IC, or upon its adoption, the lingering cancer in South Africa in-
cluded a number of the remaining criminal statutes like those ad-
dressed in Zuma and Makwanyane and portions of the common law
which had been manipulated to accommodate gross violations of
human rights despite long-standing notions of fairness and justice.
In 1995, the CCT attacked a great number of these issues.
2
Unity and Reconciliation" are deemed to be part of the new Constitution
for the purposes of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act, 1995 (Act 34 of 1995), as amended, including for the purposes of its
validity.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, sched. 6, art. 22.
Schedule 7 to the IC lists a whole series of such las relating to the creation of the Ban-
tustans and, eventually, the quasi-sovereign, though centrally controlled, Transkei, Bophuthat-
swana, Venda and Ciskei states. See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), sched. 7.
In Zuma the court discussed the manipulation of the common law. See Zuma, 1995 (2)
SALRat 650. Justice Kentridge, writing for the Court, said:
The presumption of innocence, the right of silence and the proscription of
compelled confessions have for 150 )-ears or more been recognized as basic
principles of our law, although all of them have to a greater or lesser de-
gree been eroded by statute in some cases byjudicial decision.
Id.
From 1995-1997, the highest concentration of the Court's judgments concerned the right
to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence. Se, State v. Rens, 1996 (1) SMAL 1218 (CC)
(regarding the right to appeal); State v. Ntuli, 1996 (1) SALR 1207 (CC) (regarding the right to
appeal); Shabalala and Five Others v. Attorney General of the Transvaal and Another, 1996 (1)
SALR 726 (CC) (striking down a blanket docket privilege that precluded an accused person
from having access to the contents of police records in all circumstances-whether information
could prove exculpatory or not-and from ever consulting ith State itnesses %%ithout the con-
sent of the prosecution, which was entirely discretionary); Vennaas, 1995 (3) SALR 292 (CC)
(regarding the right to counsel). On the heals of Zuma, the Court eiscerated an additional
burden of proof inequities. See State v. Bhulw ana; State v. Gi%-diso, 1996 (1) SALR 388 (CC)
(holding unconstitutional the presumption in the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992
that the mere possession of a certain amount of marijuana creates an inference of an intent to
deal); State v. Mbatha; State v. Prinsloo, 1997 (3) SALR 1012 (holding unconstitutional a proi-
sion of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 which made the finding of arms on some-
one's premise or vehicle presumptive proof of possession); State vJulies, 1996 (4) SALR 313
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IV. GAUTENG PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE: EQUAL ACCESS TO
EDUCATION
A. The CCT Settles In
Also in the Court's first year, the Court checked executive power
through an exercise of its constitutional authority and safeguarded
the constitutional balance between the national and provincial levels
of government in Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and
Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others.'°° The
Court's decision to carry out its initial assertion of supremacy over
each of the other branches of government confirmed the Court's
commitment to the protection of Fundamental Rights announced in
Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution. Thus, the Court confirmed its
institutional integrity and perhaps most importantly, its own imparti-
ality."'
In 1996, the CCT turned more of its attention to addressing the
balance between the national and provincial levels of govemmentY02
(CC) (following Bhulwana and Gwadiso); Scagell and Others v. Attorney General, western Cape
and Others, 1997 (2) SALR 368 (CC) (striking down provisions of the Gambling Act 51 of 1965
that preventing an authorized policeman from entering a place was a presumptive violation of
the Act). Counting State v. Bequinot, 1997 (2) SALR 887 (CC), a similar case which was held to
have been improperly referred, and Prinsloo v. Van der Linde and Another, 1997 (3) SALR 1012
(CC), in which this issue was mentioned but was not dispositive, cases involving impermissible
burdens of proof accounted for nine of the first fifty-one cases the Court decided. Cases relat-
ing to criminal justice accounted for nine of the fourteen, or sixty-four percent, of the judg-
ments handed down in 1995, including the abolition ofjuvenile whipping as a form of punish-
ment, see State v. Williams and Others, 1995 (3) SALR 632 (CC), and the abolition of debtor's
prison, see Coetzee v. Government of the Rep. of South Africa and Others; Matiso v. Command-
ing Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and Others, 1995 (4) SALR 631 (CC).
1995 (4) SALR 887 (CC) (striking down certain presidential proclamations and further
striking down the delegation of legislative power to the President, on which the authority of the
proclamations were based).
'O' Based on the history of the judiciary, South Africans were no more than cautiously opti-
mistic about whether the CCT would be a real agent of change. The ANC had faith in the CGT,
but the predominantly white political parties and the Inkatha Freedom Party, representing
primarily the people of the Zulu kingdom, were not convinced that the C-'T would be impar-
tial. Although the Court's opening was marked by many laudatory headlines, some newspapers
questioned the Justices' partisanship. Cf Patrick Lawrence & Gail Irwin, Watchdogs of the Consti-
tution, THE STAR, Feb. 13, 1995, at 13 (providing photographs and biographical sketches of each
of the eleven CCT Justices) with Bob Drogin, 11 Activists Sworn in for New S. African Court, LA.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1995, at A8 (noting that some "critics have called the new court too white, too
male and too stacked with partisans of the ANC .... "). Considering the daunting task of un-
raveling the corrupted jurisprudence of the apartheid era and restoring trust in the judiciary's
role as the protector of rights, it may have been warranted for the Court to have acted with far
less moderation than they did.
" The Court was responsible for twenty-four judgments in 1996. Seven of the twenty-four
judgments, or twenty-nine percent of total judgments, concerned the national and provincial
balance. Included in this calculation were judgments regarding the certification of the Consti-
tution, as well as the Kwazulu-Natal Constitution. Eight of the twenty-four judgments in 1996,
or thirty-three percent of total judgments for that year, concerned criminal law statutes.
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For example, the Gauteng Provincial Legislature dispute on the consti-
tutionality of a provincial education bill banning certain types of
school admission tests addressed this concern. 3 This Section exam-
ines the Gauteng dispute as a backdrop against which the CCTjudg-
ments evolved. This Section explores: (i) the discretion within the
Section 35 mandate to consider other constitutional law, (ii) the
comparative insights the Gauteng dispute provides for the new Consti-
tution, and (iii) the complexities involved in the creation of positive
obligations, for example, creating a right to education. Such positive
obligations are common in modem constitutions.
B. Background
On November 1, 1995, the first set of nation-wide local elections
held with universal suffrage took place under the watchful eyes of in-
ternational and non-govemmental organizations." The ANC won in
all but one province.3" In the later 1996 elections, the Inkatha Free-
dom Party won in Kwazulu-Natal, and the old National Party won in
the Western Cape.- Both of these parties were understandably con-
cemed about protecting their respective power bases. The parties
found a common interest in working to secure a high degree of con-
stitutional protection and respect for minority rights. In this light,
one may easily understand why issues of national power, especially
national legislative power, have continuously provoked a high degree
of scrutiny and a fair amount of constitutional litigation between the
national and provincial governments.
The National Party, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Demo-
cratic Party challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions of
the National Education Policy Bill relating to the powers conferred
upon the Minister of Education.!7 The Court found the contested
provisions of the bill to be constitutional since they created only an
advisory and cooperative structure for the formulation of education
policy at the national and provincial levels and did not empower the
See In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Gauteng
School Education Bill of 1995 (herein GautengProvincialLegislature). 1996 (3) S.ALR 165 (CC).
The Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal Provinces were, by constitutional amendment.
given additional time to hold elections, see Second Amendment Act No. 44 1995, which were
held in lay andJune of 1996 respectively. The elections in 1994 were national elections which
elected individuals such as President Nelson Mandela.
SeeAFRIcA NEWS, Nov. 13, 1995 (stating that the ANC dominated seven out of eight prov-
inces).
" See Mandela extends 'hand of peace to rivals in Kzamlu-Natal, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS,July 7, 1996 (reporting that the IFP defeated the AWC in Kwazulu-Natal); Dep-
uty President de Klerk says ANC's ticks failed in W1esern Cope eletions, BBC SUMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS,June 2, 1996 (declaring national party victory in the Western Cape).
"' See GuatengProvincial Legislature, 1996 (3) SALR at 178 (dismissing petitioner's argument
that the Bill was unconstitutional because it infringed on the rights and powers of governing
bodies of certain schools without the constitutionally requisite negotiation of administrative
authority).
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Minister of Education to force provinces to adhere to his or her pol-
icy."' Each province had the right to adopt its own education policy,
subject to certain constitutional constraints and to certain national
oversight provisions of the bill which the Court held inoffensive.0
C. The End of Separate and Unequal
Broadly speaking, the early stages of racial integration of the
South African educational system have progressed somewhat more
smoothly than in the United States. Nevertheless, one should not
judge integration too quickly based on the early successes of larger,
well-known institutions with much at stake in the new political envi-
ronment.310 For example, the process toward integration at elemen-
tary and secondary school levels has been problematic in a number of
areas.3 ' Despite justifiable fears that white separatists would lead
large-scale conflagrations, there have been relatively few instances of
violence or large-scale disobedience in support of traditionally all-
white institutions. Many proponents of integration, however, were
anxious about its practical implications because a fair degree of stub-
bornness persisted among these institutions.
In fact, many of the white public and state-funded schools tried to
avoid integration by adopting a host of both obvious and more subtle
measures designed to perpetuate segregation. These measures in-
cluded residency requirements and language tests as well as cultural
and religious manifestos. A dispute arose in Gauteng Provincial Legis-
lature regarding the inclusion in the School Education Bill of 1995 of
provisions designed to prohibit such practices. This dispute was re-
-" See id. at 178-82.
.See id.
310 SeeDirty WarErupts at Wits, MAIL & GuARDIAN, Nov. 10-16, 1995.
' See, e.g., Ramotena Mabote, Technikon Acts to Discipline Rector, SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995,
at 2 (discussing allegations of racism against professors and other subsequent racial clashes);
Edyth Bulbring, The Pluses and Minuses on Bengu's Blackboard, SUNDAY TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, at
31 (discussing the failure of education reform efforts designed to assist black students).
"' There has been, however, some small-scale resistance. See generally S. Africa Court Outlaws
School Discrimination, Assoc. Press, Apr. 5, 1995 (describing resistance by conservative whites that
required police to escort black children to formerly all-white schools).
"3See Gauteng Provincial Legislature 1996 (3) SALR at 171-72. The School Education Bill of
1995 included a number of provisions prohibiting the use of proxy tests designed to maintain
segregation. See Gauteng School Bill of 1985, §§ 19, 21, 22. Section 19 stated:
(1) Language competence testing shall not be used as an admission re-
quirement to a public school.
(2) Learners at public schools shall be encouraged to make use of the
range of official languages.
(3) No learner at a public school or a private school which receives a sub-
sidy in terms of Section 69 shall be punished for expressing himself or her-
self in a language which is not a language of learning of the school con-
cerned.
Id. at § 19.
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ferred to the CCT in accordance with Section 98(9) of the IC by the
Speaker of the Gauteng legislature pursuant to a request by one-third
of its members. 4 The parties contesting the provisions argued that
Section 21 of the bill stated:
(1) The religious policy of a public school shall be made by the governing
body of the school concerned after consultation iuth the department. and
subject to the approval of the Member of the Executive Council.
(2) The religious policy of a public school shall be developed uithin the
framework of the following principles:
(a) The education process should aim at the development of a na-
tional, democratic culture of respect for our country's diverse cultural
and religious traditions.
(b) Freedom of conscience and of religion shall be respected at all
public schools.
(3) If, at any time, the Member of the Executive Council has reason to be-
lieve that the religious policy of a public school does not comply uith the
principles set out in subsection (2) or the requirements of the Constitu-
tion, the Member of the Executive Council may, after consultation wvith the
governing body of the school concerned, direct that the religious policy of
the school shall be reformulated in accordance with subsections (I) and
(2).
(4) The provisions of section 18(4) to (8) shall apply mutalis mutandis to a
directive issued by the Member of the Executive Council under subsection
(3) and in such application any reference to language policy shall be con-
strued as a reference to religious policy.
Id. at § 21.
Section 22 statec
(1) No person employed at any public school shall attempt to indoctrinate
learners into any particular belief or religion.
(2) No person employed at any public school or private school shall in die
course of his or her employTnent denigrate any religion.
(3) (a) (i) Every learner at a public school, or at a private school which re-
ceives a subsidy in terms of Section 69, shall have the right not to attend re-
ligious education classes and religious practices at that school.
(ii) In this regard the department shall respect the rights and du-
ties of parents to provide direction to their children in the exercise
of their rights as learners, in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacity of the children concerned.
(b) The right conferred by paragraph (a) on a learner at a private
school which receives a subsidy in terms of Section 69, may be limited
where such limitation is necessary to preserve the religious character of
the private school concerned.
(c) Except as is provided for in paragraph (b) no person employed at a
public school, or at a private school which receives a subsidy in terms
of Section 69, shall in any way discourage a learner from choosing not
to attend religious education classes or religious practices at that
school.
(4) No person employed at a public school shall be obliged or in any way
unduly influenced to participate in any of the religious education classes or
religious practices at that school.
Id at § 22.
31, See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 98(9). This provision permitting preliminary ru-
ings prior to the adoption of a law is similar to Article 61 of the French Constitulion du 4 Odebre
1958, as amended on October 29, 1974, though the French provision requires any question re-
garding constitutionality to be raised before a bill is adopted. See JOHN BELL, FREN H
CONSTITUTIONAL LxW 258 (1992).
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those provisions violated their lights delineated in Section 32(c) of
the IC. Section 32 of the IC, entitled "Education," is the last funda-
mental right included in Chapter 3, and reads as follows:
Every person shall have the right-
(a) to basic education and equal access to educational
institutions;
(b) to instruction in the language of his or her choice
where this is reasonably practicable; and
(c) to establish, where practicable, educational institu-
tions based on a common culture, language or religion,
provided that there shall be no discrimination on the
ground of race.3' 5
The most important argument put forth by the petitioners was
that Section 32(c) imposed an affirmative duty on the government to
establish such schools where it is practicable to do so. Therefore, they
argued, the government has no authority to prohibit language-testing
for admissions, to direct the development of religious policy, or to
dictate who should be required to be instructed in religion at such
schools.
316
Addressing the core argument, the Court held that Section 32(c)
creates a permissive right, allowing individuals to establish private
schools without government funding based on common culture, lan-
guage or religion, provided that the establishment of such an institu-
tion is practicable and that the institution does not discriminate on
the basis of race.317 The judgment also referred to this ability as a de-
fensive right,18 or the right of an individual to defend the establish-
ment of such an institution. In this context, the Court noted that the
state must respect and permit, but is under no obligation to fund, the
establishment of such schools. However, those establishing them may
defend their right to do so against state encroachment on the basis of
Section 32(c).' 9 Because of the circumstances surrounding the dis-
pute rather than the legal questions addressed by the Court, the
judgment was hailed as the South African equivalent of Brown v.
Board of Education.320
D. Discretion in the Section 35 Analysis
Thisjudgment highlights the fact that the CCT is only required to
take into consideration public international law "where applicable.
321
"' See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 32. The right to education is now contained in
Section 29 of the Constitution.
,,6 See Gauteng Provincial Legislature, 1996 (3) SALR at 171-73.
"' See id. at 173, 177.
... See id. at 172.
3" See id. at 173, 177.
' See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"' SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35.
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The Court's discretion to determine whether the use of international
sources is applicable provides the CCT with a dimension of control
over the constitutional mandate of Section 35.2 The conclusions
reached by Justice Mahomed, writing on behalf of nine Justices in
Gauteng Provincial Legislature, made very little use of both interna-
tional and foreign comparative law. In fact, the only reference to
foreign comparative law was made in witten arguments submitted to
the Court.ss Justice Mahomed rightly dismissed the alleged relev-ance
based on the "wholly distinguishable" language of the Charter."l Al-
though dearly rejecting this foreign jurisprudence, Justice Mahomed
did not state why he did not find any other source of public interna-
tional law applicable.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sachs reviewed the public inter-
national law considerations at length, illuminating the issue and un-
derscoring the relevance of the public law considerations to the deci-
sion.sss The question arises, then, whether Justice Mahomed should
have felt compelled by Section 35 to consider the foreign law con-
tained in Justice Sachs' opinion.The discretionary clause, "where ap-
plicable," grants the Court the ability to resolve constitutional ques-
tions without the influence of public international law when the
Court does not deem it necessary to give meaning or content to a
Chapter 3 right in the context of a dispute before the Corl. One interpre-
tation of the clause "where applicable" would apply it to the context
of the dispute before the Court and not to whether on-point public
international law exists. The difficulty with this interpretation is that
it could actually restrict the Court's reference to public international
law to only international treaties and agreements binding on South
Africa. This interpretation, however, has been rejected by the CCT,
which has not hesitated to review the probative value of non-binding
international instruments and jurisprudence.-"
It should be noted that this interpretation of the ambit ofjudicial
discretion under Section 35 of the IC might be altered by operation
' Interestingly enough, although that provision states the Court mai. have regard to com-
parable foreign case law," id. at ch. 3, § 35, the CCT has more often looked to foreign case law
for interpretive assistance than to public international law.
See GautengProvinda!Legisature, 1996 (3) SALR at 175 (noting the petitioner's citation to
Section 23 of the Canadian Charter, CAN. CoNsT. (Constitutional Act, 1982). pt. 1 (Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 23, which relates to language rights in the context of educa-
tion).
See id. at 176.
See id. at 185, 204-07 (Sachs,J., concurring) (discussing United Nations debates and vari-
ous international treaties that do not create a state responsibility to establish a particular kind of
educational institution).
" See, e.g., Malnvanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 413-14 (explaining the value of international
authority to assist the CCT); see also Gauteng Provincial Legislature, 1996 (3) S.ALR at 186 n.9 (ad-
vocating the application of internationally accepted principles to Section 32 of the IC); John
Dugard, Public InternationaloLa, in CONSTrITrOAL L.w OF SOUTH AFRic.s, 13-9 - 13-11 (mat-
thew Chaskalon et al. eds., 1996) (explaining that the CCT has considered international treaties
and decisions in their interpretation of Chapter 3 of the IC and issues affecting human rights).
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of Section 39 of the new Constitution, which does not contain a
qualified obligation. Section 39 appears to mandate the considera-
tion of international law, since it now uses the word "must," instead of
the "where applicable" qualifier appearing in Section 35 of the IC.'27
Perhaps this alteration was meant to stop judges from limiting the
breadth of the rights of the accused, detained, or convicted by assert-
ing that international norms regarding human rights interpretations
may only rarely be applicable due to the "unique complexities" of the
South African reality. In addition, it appears that even administrative
tribunals and alternative dispute resolution fora are now called upon
by Section 39 to inform their interpretation of protected rights by
reference to transnational jurisprudence.328 Even if this is the case,
the obligation is only to consider international public law, not to be
bound by it.32 At most, therefore, Section 39's mandate to consider
international law may only require courts to include in their analyses
an explanation of why international law is or is not useful to the in-
terpretation of the right at issue.
The dispute in Gauteng Provincial Legislature involved at its core an
interpretation of Section 32. Specifically, unless Section 32(c) cre-
ated an obligation on the state to establish and to fund certain types
of schools, the Petitioner's claim that that right was violated by a stat-
ute which fails to establish (or fund) such schools was moot.!3 As
stated earlier, Justice Mahomed held that Section 32(c) did not cre-
ate such an obligation on the state.33' The section merely accorded
individuals a right to create such institutions privately, if practicable
and non-discriminatory on the basis of race, and to have this right
protected by law.332 From this point of view, and in the context of this
dispute, the application of public international law was not important
to advance the Court's understanding or appreciation of the right in
question. The petitioners simply relied on a clearly untenable inter-
pretation easily contradicted by reference to the interim Constitu-
tion.33 Perhaps if counsel for the Petitioners had argued an interpre-
tation about which reasonable minds could differ, Justice Mahomed
would have felt that reference to comparative constitutional law
sources was warranted. This does not mean, however, that on-point
public international law might not have been helpful to reinforce the
holding. Justice Mahomed could have adopted or referenced por-
tions of Justice Sachs's concurring opinion in support of his conclu-
Cf S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (I), ch. 3, § 35 with S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 39.
See S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 39 (mandating that courts, tribunals and forums con-
sider international law).
"'See id.
See Gauteng Provincial Legislature 1996 (3) SALR at 177.
3" See id.
See id. at 174, 177.
See id. at 172-73.
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sion.sm
E. Comparing the Modem Constitution
One inescapable observation in Gauteng Provincial Legislature con-
cers the rights created in Section 32. The right to education is
common to modem constitutions and appears in certain interna-
tional instruments," although its expression differs greatly from
country to country. In the United States, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has long been the primary tool in the struggle for equality.'" It
has also been, by necessity, a multi-purpose tool, protecting the right
to equality across a broad spectrum of issues including education, so-
cial welfare and gender. s ' Perhaps owing to the civil law tradition,
most modem constitutions provide a more detailed list of rights,
many of which contain a residual equality component."" For exam-
ple, analysis of a dispute regarding a constitutional right to housing
might easily necessitate an evaluation of ancillary equality issues if a
mortgage is denied.mo
Section 8 of the IC states the right to equality as follows:
(1) Every person shall have the right to equality before the
law and to equal protection of the law.
(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, di-
rectly or indirectly, and, without derogating from the gen-
erality of this provision, on one or more of the following
grounds in particular. race, gender, sex, ethnic or social
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture or language.
(3) (a) This section shall not preclude measures designed
to achieve the adequate protection and advancement of
persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and
See id. at 203-5 (Sachs,J., concurring).
. See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 32.
. See, eg., CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982). Pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 29; FR. CONSr. (Preamble to the 1946 Constitution), para. 13; GRNDGESETZ
[Constitution] [GG] art. 7 (F.R.G.); HUNG. CONsT. art 70F(2); NAtMIB. CoNST. art. 20: T.%,NZ.
CONSr. art. 11(1); BANJUL CHARTERON HUMAN AND PEOPLE's RIGHTS art. 17(l).June 27, 1981.
21 I.LM. 58; UNVERsAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GA Res. 217A (1I1). A. 26, 3 UX.
GAOR, Resolutions pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
See U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
See, e-g., Nississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that men
cannot be excluded from a nursing school where such exclusion only serves to promote a
stereotype; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down statutes preventing marriage on
the basis of race); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking do-wn
a poll tax as a condition for voting).
' FR. CONsT. (Preamble to the 1946 Const.) par. 3-13; GRLNDGEsE-TZ [GG] arts. 1-19
(F.R.G.); HUNG. CONST. arts. 54-70/k; NAMIB. CONsT. arts. 5-25; TANz. Co.sT. arts. 5,9-30.
m The interim Constitution provided for a right to housing. See S. AFR. CO.5T. of 1993
(IC), ch. 3, § 26.
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equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.
(b) Every person or community dispossessed of rights in
land before the commencement of this Constitution un-
der any law which would have been inconsistent with sub-
section (2) had that subsection been in operation at the
time of the dispossession, shall be entitled to claim restitu-
tion of such rights subject to and in accordance with sec-
tions 121, 122 and 123.
(4) Prima fade proof of discrimination on any of the
grounds specified in subsection (2) shall be presumed to be
sufficient proof of unfair discrimination as contemplated in
that subsection, until the contrary is established. 1
For obvious historical reasons, this is the first "Fundamental
Right" granted in Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution. 32 It is also
the first right enshrined in the new Constitution." Although the
Court has since been called upon to interpret this right to equality on
a number of occasions,3 " the existence of Section 32 had the seem-
ingly odd result in Gauteng Provincial Legislature of placing the judicial
review of the anti-discriminatory provisions of the Bill outside of the
direct context of Section 8.
Although the development ofjurisprudence concerning the right
to education need not be divorced in every case from considerations
of equality, the Court in Gauteng Provincial Legislature did not face
questions directly related to the juncture between these rights. A
case involving allegations of discrimination against an existing private
soSee id. at ch. 3, § 8.
' Chapter 3, Sections 7 to 35, define the "Fundamental Rights" contained in the interim
Constitution. Section 7 guarantees standing to sue and applies the responsibilities contained in
the Constitution to the government. See S. AF. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 7.
" Section 9 of the new Constitution reads as follows:
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection
and benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and free-
doms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, dis-
ability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against any-
one on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legisla-
tion must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3)
is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 9.
.. See State v. Rens, 1996 (1) SALR 1218 (CC). See also President and Another v. Hugo, 1997
(4) SALR 1 (CC); Prinsloo v. Van der Linde and Another, 1997 (3) SALR 1012; Fraser v. Chil-
dren's Court, Pretoria North and Others, 1997 (2) SALR 218 (CC); Brink v. Kitshoff, 1996 (4)
SALR 197 (CC).
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institution would be a better example. Such a case might even re-
quire the Court to balance the right to equal access to educational in-
stitutions provided by Section 32(a), and the right to equality of the
law under Section 8, against Section 32 (c), which provides for the es-
tablishment of educational institutions on the basis of a common cul-
ture, language or religionYm For instance, to achieve the goal of pro-
viding a common religious school, the school may have to deny a
student of another religion, admission even though Section 32(a)
guarantees the right to equal access to educational institutions. Al-
though the IC does account for the overlapping equality component
in the right to education, a it does not cover all conceivable instances
where a right is granted but equal results cannot be guaranteed.s'
Although that was not the case here, Gauteng Provincial Legislature
serves as a harbinger of the outstanding issue, that a Court needs to
address the unqualified granting of a right to all citizens of equality
that cannot necessarily be achieved on an equal basis in all areas. In
these instances, as in the United States, the CCT would have to "read
in" the equality component.
F. The New Right to Education
In the wake of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature decision and pub-
lic debate, the right to education was significantly clarified in Section
29 of the new Constitution."8 It now states:
(1) Everyone has the right -
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic education;
and
(b) to further education, which the state, through rea-
sonable measures, must make progressively available and
accessible.
(2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the offi-
cial language or languages of their choice in public educa-
tional institutions where that education is reasonably practi-
cable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and
implementation of, this right, the state must consider all
reasonable educational alternatives, including single me-
dium institutions, taking into account-
(a) equity;
(b) practicability;, and
See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, §§ 32(a) - (c).
See id. at ch. 3, § 32. Section 32 of the IC explicitly qualifies a right to instruction in the lan-
guage of one's choice or based on a common culture or religion with the words "where practicable.-
See Ud Without this qualifier, one might argue that Section 8 guarantees equal right to education of
one's choice to all citizens without pragmatic qualification. See id. at ch. 3, § 8.
" See; g., idL at ch. 3, §§ 19, 22, 26 (providing the right to choose a place of residence, ac-
cess to the courts, and economic activity respectivel)').
m' See S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 29.
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(c) the need to redress the results of past racially dis-
criminatory laws and practices.
(3) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at
their own expense, independent educational institutions
that -
(a) do not discriminate on the basis of race;
(b) are registered with the state; and
(c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards
at comparable public educational institutions.
(4) Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for in-
dependent educational institutions.39
Interestingly, the interim Constitution's specific reference to "equal
access to educational institutions" was removed.35 ° Nevertheless, the
changes in wording did not divorce the equality component from the
right. It now appears, however, that the equality component in the
right to education must be "read in" to Section 29(1) with regard to
public school education, 5' although certain constitutional restraints
will apply to private education through subsection (3). 35' Certainly
there will be room for judicial evaluation of equality when the matter
of what constitutes "basic education" and "adult basic education" is
determined by the legislature,35 or in the event of a dispute, by the
courts. For example, a question may arise as to whether the concept
of a right to "basic education" includes access to at least, current
textbooks, a hot meal and a chair for every student. Curiously, the
new right to education does not include an explicit positive obliga-
tion on the state with regard to basic education.3-4 This undoubtedly
reflects the drafters' inability to resolve the complex jurisdictional
questions surrounding the need for a coordinated education policy at
the national and the provincial levels, as exemplified by the dispute
involved in the National Education Policy Bill case.355 By allowing cer-
tain of these elements to remain vague, the drafters opened up a po-
tential hornet's nest of litigation designed to determine the content
of the Section 29 rights.
Nevertheless, where one field of potential conflict is left open by
9Id.
Cf S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 29 with S. AFR. CONST. of 1993, ch. 3, § 32.
.. The government's obligation "to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of,
this right" clearly relates only to the contingent right in subsection (2) of Section 29 to receive
education in an official language of choice. See S. AFR. CONsT. of 1996, ch. 2, § 29(2). Section
29(3), however, makes more affirmative requirements such as the prohibition against discrimi-
nation. See id. at § 29(3)(a).
See id. at § 29(3) (allowing the right to establish and maintain private schools, but without racial
discrimination or standards inferior to public schools).
' See id at § 29(1).
'n Section 29(1), the state must take reasonable measures to make "further education" available
and accessible. However, there is no mandate that the state should do the same concerning basic cdu-
cation. Cf id. at § 29(1)(b) with id. at § 29(1)(a).
See 1996(3) SALR at 178.
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the drafters, the source of conflict in GautengProvincial Legislature was
definitively dosed; probably in response to Gauteng Provincial Legisla-
ture, Section 29(3) of the new Constitution, the homologue of Sec-
tion 32(c) of the IC, which clarifies that private institutions may be
established at the expense of those establishing them.7 Section 29 actually
outlines additional requirements for such establishment, including
state registration and conformity to comparable public school stan-
dards. 3 Section 29(3), however, leaves out the interim Constitu-
tion's Section 32 proviso regarding practicability;-"" however, this is
only logical, considering that such institutions must be privately
funded, although they are not precluded from receiving discretionary
governmental funding.s 9 Also unlike Section 32, Section 29 does not
limit the authority for "independent" institutions to common lan-
guage, culture and religious schools.so
Another observation concerning modern constitutions is revealed
by the nature of the dispute in Gauteng Provincial Legislature. Peti-
tioners sought ajudicial determination that the state had a positive ob-
ligation to create and fund common language, culture or religious
educational institutions.6 ' Although rejected, this argument under-
scores how many modern constitutions have undertaken to engineer
the administrative state in addition to the legislative, executive and
judicial offices. In many instances, this engineering explicitly calls for
the adoption of specific legislation and the establishment of particu-
lar organizations, or otherwise creates positive and sometimes expen-
sive obligations on the state.sss Although this was not held to be the
case for Section 32 of the IC in Gauteng Provincial Legislature, the
Court noted that Section 23 of the Canadian Charter explicitly cre-
ates such an obligation m Arguably, many of these provisions were
See S. AFR. CO NST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 29(3).
'7 See i
Cf S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 29(3) with S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC). ch. 3. § 32(c).
Note, however, that § 29(2)(b) maintains the practicability proviso. See S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2.
§ 29(2)(b).
See S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 29(4).
Section 29(3) does not qualify what types of educational institutions individuals have the right to
establish. See id. at § 29(3).
's, See Gauteng Provincial Legislature, 1996 (4) SALR at 174.
For example, Sections 110-123 of the interim Constitution call for the creation of the Of-
fice of a Public Protector, appointed by the President, a Human Rights Commission, a Commis-
sion on Gender Equality, and for the writing of legislation regarding the Restitution of Land
Rights. SeeS. APm CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 8, §§ 110-123. The new Constitution proiidcs for
these and other similar administrative bodies in Sections 181-197. &e S. AR. COsST. of 1996,
ch. 9, §§ 181-187. The right to property in Section 25 of the new Constitution now contains in
subsection 9 the requirement for national legislation regarding land restitution. Se r& at ch. 2.
§ 25(a).
' See GautengProvincial Legislature 1996 (3) SALR at 175 (citing Section 23 of the Canadian
Charter). The Charter states in applicable part:
(3) The right of citizens of Canada ... to have their children receive pri-
mary and secondary school instruction in the language of the English or
French linguistic minority... (b) includes, where the number of those
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written with an eye towards a more ideal future, as exemplified by
Section 29(1) (b)."' Certainly some of these provisions cannot be
given their full measure of effect under current budget constraints
and, indeed, several Justices have indicated their concerns about the
practical and fiscal implications of such positive obligations.'G' Never-
theless, the Constitutional Assembly drafted a new Bill of Rights
which includes two new rights, the right to housing and the right to
health care, food, water and social security,"6 and far more positive
obligations than the IC. The new Constitution includes:
* The obligation to enact national legislation against unfair dis-
crimination in the right to equality;
67
" The obligations arising by operation of the right to a safe envi-
ronment;368
* The obligation to enact national legislation addressing the prob-
lem of pat discriminatory practices concerning land entitlement
and use, and (ii) giving effect to the right to access to informa-
tion and to the right to just administrative action;
370
" The obligation to provide for the legal representation of a child at
state expense in civil proceedings affecting the child;3 71 and
* The obligations to provide counsel for detainees, prisoners and
accused persons in terms of Section 35.2
children so warrants, the right to have them receive that instruction in mi-
nority language educational facilities provided out of public funds.
Id.
See S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 29(l)(b) (stating generally that the state must make "further
education ... progressively" available in the future).
See, e.g., Vermaas, 1995 (3) SALR at 299 (CC) (indicating in dicta that regardless of the dif-
ficulties the government must eventually comply with the obligation to provide counsel at pub-
lic expense in accordance with Section 25(3) (e) of the IC); State v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SALR at
886-87; State v. Ntuli, 1996 (1) SALR 1207, 1213 (CC) (state put on notice of constitutional de-
ficiency regarding right to appeal and given time to correct); Minister ofjustice v. Ntuli, 1997
(3) SALR 772 (CC) (Parliament's request for extension of time denied). But see AZAPO, 1996
(4) SALR 671, 700 (CC) (Didcott, J., concurring) (indicating his dissatisfaction with the fact
that monetary considerations may have played too important a role injustice Mahomed DP's
opinion). For a discussion of the right to counsel under the IC see Sharon Meadows, Implement-
ing the Right To Counsel in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 453
(1995).
See S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, §§ 26, 27 (providing for the right to housing and the right to
health care, food, water and social security respectively).
67 See id. at § 9(4) ("National legislation must be enacted to prevent.., unfair discrimination.")
(emphasis added).
See id. at § 24 ("Everyone has a right (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or
well being: and (b)... to have the environment protected ... through reasonable legislative and other
measures .... ").
See id. at §§ 25(6), 25(9) (mandating that Parliament pass laws to redress past discrimination
concerning land use).
"" See id. at §§ 32 (requiring legislation to protect the right to access information); id. at §§ 33
(guaranteeing the right to just and fair administrative action).
,, See id. at § 28(h).
3n See id. at § 35(2) (c) ("To have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the
state and at the state expense.").
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V. AZAP. THE COURT LooKs AHEAD
In addition to providing South Africans of all backgrounds with
an understanding of the constitutional process and soliciting their
input, the educational campaigns undertaken by NGOs, including
student representatives of the Azanian Peoples Organization
(AZAPO),S- and the Constitutional Assembly attempted to inform
people of the value of a Bill of Rights generally, as well as informing
the people about the content of each individual right.'74 This effort
included instruction on the reciprocal obligations that come with
having rights. For example, the right to free speech implies the obli-
gation to allow others to speak freely. Not surprisingly, given South
Africa's history of oppression, public understanding of the reciprocal
nature of rights required more time to take root. The euphoria over
the exercise of new freedoms easily eclipsed the sense of obligation
attached to these freedoms. For instance, although a positive move-
ment toward labor solidarity and unionism emerged, both sides
tended to take uncompromising positions and often employed
somewhat destructive practices in many of the ensuing strikes and
demonstrations. These standoffs forced business to close operations,
resulting in some diminished productive capacity and unfortunate
increases in unemployment and all of the related ills. Outside of the
labor context, accepting reciprocal obligations was also a problem.
Unfamiliarity with paying taxes meant that government housing and
sewage programs faced serious challenges. Previously, for example,
many non-white South Africans had withheld tax money in protest
against the apartheid government s In an attempt to break this habit,
organizations, such as the "Masakane-Let's Build Together" Program
led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, took it upon themselves to explain
that the government's effectiveness depended on the payment of
taxes.
' AZAPO was founded in the late 1970's by former members of Black Consciousness who
wanted to reshape the goals of the BC to focus upon state oppression while moving beyond its
original formulation of racial identity. S4 eg., AN-TOY VW NLMARX. LESSONS OF STRUCCLE:
SOUTH AFRIcAN INTERNAL OpposrrToN, 1960-1990, at 73-4 (1992) (discussing generally the his-
tory and politics of AZAPO and BC).
"' See generally id. at 86 (explaining how through the goals of its constitution, the AZAPO sought
to politicize and mobilize Black workers to demand their legitimate rights).
" This tax protest, which took place in late 1991, was in direct response to the imposition of a
Value Added Tax on food, medicine, water, and electricity. The strike was organized by a broad coali-
tion of South African trade unions and welfare groups and it prompted roughly 3.5 to 4 million black
workers, roughly eighty percent of the South African workforce in manufacturing and industry, to boy-
cott their jobs. See, e.g., John Carlin, ANC and Unions Flex Muscle in Tar Protest. THE LONDON
INDEP., Oct. 1, 1991, at 11; John Carin, Popular Black Support for SA Strike. THE LONDON NID)EP..
Nov. 6, 1991, at 13; Mark Hubard & David Beresford, South Africa: Trade Unions and Welfare Groups
Coalition Plan Tax, REUTER TEiNE GUARDIAN, Sept. 24. 1991. at 9: Judd Ngwen)a. Violence
Erupts in South African Tax Protest, REUTER LIBRARY REP.. Nov. 5,1991.
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A. Background
One of the more unfortunate legacies of the physical and eco-
nomic harm inflicted on the black majority in South Africa is the
high level of psychological damage reflected throughout South Afri-
can society. Although the wounds of apartheid may never completely
heal-the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was specifically es-
tablished to treat them.
AZAPO has a long history of providing aggressive advocacy for the
rights of the underprivileged in South Africa." 6 In Azanian Peoples'
Organization (AZAPO) and Others v. President of the Republic of South Af
rica and Others,377 the group sought to prevent the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission from granting amnesty to those who partici-
pated in the events leading to the deaths of Steve Biko and Griffiths
Mxenge.3  The descendants of these two men, martyrs to the cause
of freedom in South African and killed in infamous circumstances,
joined AZAPO in its challenge to the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive act creating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Pro-
motion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.379
AZAPO based its challenge upon several points. The Petitioner's
core argument was that Section 20(7) of the Act, relating to the
granting of amnesty, constituted a violation of Section 22 of the in-
terim Constitution because it provided an exemption for the qualify-
ing offender from criminal and civil liability."0 The Petitioners also
challenged both the provisions that permitted the grant of amnesty to
a particular confessor and the provisions that permitted amnesty to
be granted to the political party or organization to which the confes-
sor belongs, including the State."1 Petitioners contended that the
grant of amnesty would degrive victims their right under Section 22
to settle their grievances. Section 22 of the IC provided that
" [e]very person shall have the right to have justiciable disputes settled
by a court of law or, where appropriate, another independent or im-
partial forum." 38 The Petitioners asserted that the Committee on
Amnesty does not constitute either a "court of law" or an "independ-
376 See MARX, supra note 373, at 87-91.
'"1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC).
See Azanian Peoples' Organization and Others v. Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
Others, 1996 (4) SALR 562, 565 (Cape Provincial Division). The Provincial Division opinion provides
the factual background to the CCT's decision reported at 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC).
' "See ia.
... See i&t at 567.
" See id.
See id. at 569.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 22. By comparison Section 34 of the new Constitu-
tion, states, "[elveryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application
of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independ-
ent and impartial tribunal or forum." S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 34.
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ent or impartial forum" as required by Section 22.
B. The Court's Analysis
The IC actually placed a positive obligation on the government of
South Africa to provide a vehicle for amnesty. This obligation flowed
from the statement on National Unity and Reconciliation:
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the
past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, con-
flict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded
on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peace-
ful co-existence and development opportunities for all
South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or
sex.
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South
African citizens and peace require reconciliation between
the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of soci-
ety.
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foun-
dation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divi-
sions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations
of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian princi-
ples in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt
and revenge.
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a
need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but
not for victimisation.
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruc-
don, amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and of-
fences associated with political objectives and committed in the
course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under
this Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off
date, which shall be a date after 8 October 1990 and before
6 December 1993, and providing for the medanisns, criteria
and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such
amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been
passed.
With this Constitution and these commitments we, the
people of South Africa, open a new chapter in the history of
our country.'
This affirmative grant of legislative authority and obligation formed
" See AZAPO(I), 1996 (4) SALR at 569.
S. AFR. CONsr. of 1993 (IC), ch. 15, § 251(4) (emphasis added).
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the heart of the Justice Mahomed's lead opinion.s Insofar as the
statement of National Unity and Reconciliation appeared to conflict
with Section 22, his analysis essentially focused on two constitutional
questions:
(1) Whether the statement of National Unity and Recon-
ciliation constitutes a provision of the Constitution in terms
of Section 33(2), and is therefore exempt from analysis
under Section 33(1)'s limitation clause and, if not, whether
the alleged violation of Section 22 can be justified in terms
of the limitations clause;" and
(2) Whether the constitutional authority for Parliament to
enact legislation providing for amnesty in terms of the
statement of National Unity and Reconciliation was ex-
ceeded by (a) Section 20(7)'s provision allowing for indi-
vidual amnesty from civil as well as criminal proceedings or
(b) that provision's similar allowance of amnesty for the di-
rect or vicarious liabilities of political organizations and the
State."s
The first question above was answered without difficulty. The
Court held that Section 232(4) of the IC explicitly provided the an-
swer. 390 That section stated:
In interpreting this Constitution a provision in any Sched-
See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR 671, 683 (CC) ("What is clear is that Parliament not only has
the authority in terms of the epilogue to make a law providing for amnesty to be granted in re-
spect of the acts, omissions and offences falling within the category defined therein but that it is
in fact obliged to do so."). Justice Mohamed's opinion was joined by all but one of the Justices.
Although agreeing with Justice Mahomed's rationale, Justice Didcott wrote separately and em-
phasized above all the relationship between the grant of amnesty and the purposes stated in the
statement of National Unity and Reconciliation. See id. at 698 (Didcott,J., concurring). Didcott
criticized parts of the Court's reasoning that he felt went beyond the interpretation of those
purposes. For example, Didcott questioned reference to cost considerations:
Nor do I attach great weight to the cost that the state would inevitably in-
cur in meeting not some obligations foisted freshly on it, but ones endured
all along from which the Legislature has now seen fit to release it. We have
no means of assessing that cost, even approximately. But, unless perhaps
its amount unbeknown to us is prohibitively high in relation to our na-
tional revenue and expenditure, it does not strike me as a strong reason
for depriving the persons to whom the obligations are owed of their nor-
mal and legal due.
Id. at 700 (DidcottJ., concurring). Justice Didcott first hinted at this position in the opinion he
wrote on behalf of the Court in Vermaas. See Vermas 1995 (3) SALR at 299-300 (CC) ("We are
mindful of the multifarious demands on the public purse and the machinery of government
that flow from the urgent need for economic and social reform. But the Constitution does not
envisage, and it will surely not brook, an undue delay in the fulfillment of any promise made by
it about a fundamental right.").
' Subsection (2) of Section 33 provided that: "Save as provided for in subsection (1) or any
other provision of this Constitution, no law, whether a rule of common law, customary law or
legislation, shall limit any right entrenched in this Chapter." S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3,
§ 33(2).
See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 681.
See id at 685.
See ih at 682-83.
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ule, including the provision under the heading National
Unity and Reconciliation, to this Constitution shall not by rea-
son only of the fact that it is contained in a Schedule, have a
lesser status than any other provision of this Constitution
which is not contained in a Schedule, and such provision
shall for all purposes be deemed to form part of the sub-
stance of this Constitution."'
Based on this Section, the Court quickly found that the statement
of National Unity and Reconciliation was entitled to equal status to all
other provisions in the IC.s92 As such, it fell within the purview of Sec-
tion 33(2), and the limitations clause was irrelevant to the analysis of
its effects. 9s
The Court's, and Justice Mahomed's, highly nuanced analysis re-
garding the second question was in sharp contrast to Mahomed's
more formal and legalistic analysis in Gauteng Provincial Legislature.
The opinion in Gauteng Provincial Legislature flowed simply from the
Court's resolution of the primary issue, mooting the more complex
issues!5" Although the Court's analysis in AZAPO was not technically
complex, the second question could not be dispatched as easily as the
first. Since the Court held that the Truth and Reconciliation Act was
not subject to the general limitations clause, the Petitioner's claim
that it granted parliamentary authority in excess of the Statement of
National Unity and Reconciliation mandate amounted to an assertion
that the grant of authority under the Act must be subject to some
other form of restriction. Therefore, the Court had to determine
whether the grant of constitutional authority to Parliament contained
any intrinsic boundaries.!" The Court had to address what is intended
by "amnesty" and analyze the manner in which the Act gave effect to
that intention -9
To address this question, the Court focused on the function of
amnesty with regard to the objectives evident in the transition to con-
stitutional democracy and outlined in the statement of National
Unity and Reconciliation. 97 The key elements ofJustice Mahomed's
eloquent and poignant assessment of the function of amnesty in the
See id& (quoting S. Ant. CoNST. of 1993 (IC) ch. 15. § 232(4)).
' See ida
'"See id. at 698.
" See Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In Re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of
Certain Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 1996 (3) SALR 165. 173-174, 183
(CC) (holding that the Interim Constitution did not place a positive obligation on the National Govern-
ment to develop culturally specific schools and, therefore, that provincial legislation outlawing tests
designed to perpetuate segregation was constitutional). Since the threshold issue went against the Peti-
tioners, the Court did not need to consider the more difficult balancing questions. See eit at 182. In
AZAPO, the Court's threshold conclusion required consideration of a second, more subtle, question.
See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 681, 688.
.. See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 698.
See id at 683-94.
.. See id at 693.
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South African context merit full inclusion:
398
Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth
in little crevices of obscurity in our history. Records are not
easily accessible, witnesses are often unknown, dead, un-
available or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is
the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing in-
stinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors
but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into ob-
jective and corroborative evidence which could survive the
rigours of the law. The Act seeks to address this massive
problem by encouraging these survivors and the depend-
ents of the tortured and the wounded, the maimed and the
dead to unburden their grief publicly, to receive the collec-
tive recognition of a new nation that they were wronged,
and, crucially, to help them to discover what did in truth
happen to their loved ones, where and under what circum-
stances it did happen, and who was responsible. That truth,
which the victims of repression seek so desperately to know
is, in the circumstances, much more likely to be forthcom-
ing if those responsible for such monstrous misdeeds are
encouraged to disclose the whole truth with the incentive
that they will not receive the punishment which they un-
doubtedly deserve if they do. Without that incentive there
is nothing to encourage such persons to make the disclo-
sures and to reveal the truth which persons in the positions
of the applicants so desperately desire. With that incentive,
what might unfold are objectives fundamental to the ethos
of a new constitutional order. The families of those unlaw-
fully tortured, maimed or traumatised become more em-
powered to discover the truth, the perpetrators become ex-
posed to opportunities to obtain relief from the burden of a
guilt or an anxiety they might be living with for many long
years, the country begins the long and necessary process of
healing the wounds of the past, transforming anger and
grief into a mature understanding and creating the emo-
tional and structural climate essential for the "reconciliation
and reconstruction" which informs the very difficult and
sometimes painful objectives of the amnesty articulated in
the epilogue.39
Even more crucially, but for a mechanism providing for
amnesty, the "historic bridge" itself might never have been
Although the Court's judgment is broken into successive sections addressing the ques-
tions of amnesty for criminal offenses and for civil offenses, with regard to the civil liability of
the State and the vicarious liability of organizations and person, the first subsection regarding
amnesty for criminal offenses sets the analytical tone for the entire decision. For this reason,
examination herein does not follow the distinctive headings outlining the judgment.
See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 684.
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erected. For a successfully negotiated transition, the terms
of the transition required not only the agreement of those
victimized by abuse but also those threatened by the transi-
tion to a "democratic society based on freedom and equal-
ity". If the Constitution kept alive the prospect of continu-
ous retaliation and revenge, the agreement of those
threatened by its implementation might never have been
forthcoming and, if it had, the bridge itself would have re-
mained wobbly and insecure, threatened by fear from some
and anger from others. It was for this reason that those who
negotiated the Constitution made a deliberate choice, pre-
ferring understanding over vengeance, reparation over re-
taliation, ubuntu over victimisation.*
In these passages, Justice Mahomed made it clear that in addition to
benefiting from textual authorization, the very nature of amnesty
serves the purpose of and objectives outlined in the statement of Na-
tional Unity and Reconciliation. In effect, the Court held that am-
nesty is at the heart of South Africa's rebirth; its inclusion in the IC
was a necessary ingredient of the transition to majority rule and con-
stitutional democracy40 As such, it is one of the costs of liberty. So
concluding, Justice Mahomed conceded that although the amnesty
process created by the Act is an imperfect one, the contested provi-
sions are flexible enough not to be constitutionally offensive'*
C. The Court Passes Beyond the Section 35 Mandate
Having determined that the statement of National Unity and Rec-
onciliation does not conflict with Section 22, the Court ias not re-
quired to refer to public international or foreign comparative law
pursuant to Section 35 of the IC.4s Nonetheless, the Court found
such reference useful and briefly reviewed the creation, purposes and
powers of the truth commissions established in Argentina, Chile and
El Salvador." He focused on points of commonality. Justice Ma-
homed explained that each was founded to deal with circumstances
similar to those underlying the transition in South Africa, and each
was empowered to grant amnesty.4 However, due to the differing
and highly subjective historical contexts of the relevant countries, it is
not surprising that the comparisons offered little instruction beyond
these general observations.
In contrast to the comparison of the truth commissions, which was
undertaken by the Court sua sponte, counsel for the applicants asked
" See i&. at 685.
43 See id
4' See id. at 686, 698.
" See S. AFR. CoNsT. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35.
SeeAZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 686-87.
See id at 686.
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the Court to consider whether Parliament should be bound by a
number of international agreements requiring the prosecution of vio-
lators of human ights.406  In this regard, AZAPO provided a new
glimpse into the legal status of such instruments under the interim
Constitution. Justice Mohamed wrote:
International law and the contents of international treaties
to which South Africa might or might not be a party at any
particular time are, in my view, relevant only in the inter-
pretation of the Constitution itself... International con-
ventions and treaties do not become part of the municipal
law of our country, enforceable at the instance of private
individuals in our courts, until and unless they are incorpo-
rated into the municipal law by legislative enactment.
4 0 7
Hence, the Court made it clear that under the IC, international
agreements and laws only aid in interpretation. The Court found
that the various provisions of Section 231 of the IC empower Parlia-
ment to make international agreements into laws. International
agreements are not self-executing and they become part of South Af-
rican law only via an express legislative provision and only if they are
not inconsistent with the Constitution.
° -
The next logical step in this analysis would have been for the
Court to review whether each of the international instruments was
made part of South African law in accordance with Section 231 of the
See id at 686.
See id. at 688.
See id. Section 231 of the IC, entitled "Continuation of international agreements and
status of international law," stated:
(1) All rights and obligations under international agreements which im-
mediately before the commencement of this Constitution were vested in or
binding on the Republic within the meaning of the previous Constitution,
shall be vested in or binding on the Republic under this Constitution, un-
less provided otherwise by an Act of Parliament.
(2) Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, be competent to agree to
the ratification of or accession to an international agreement negotiated
and signed in terms of section 82(1) (i).
(3) Where Parliament agrees to the ratification of or accession to an inter-
national agreement under subsection (2), such international agreement
shall be binding on the Republic and shall form part of the law of the Re-
public, provided Parliament expressly so provides and such agreement is
not inconsistent with this Constitution.
(4) The rules of customary international law binding on the Republic,
shall, unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament,
form part of the law of the Republic.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 15, § 231. This provision is substantially similar to the homo-
logue to Section 231 in the new Constitution that is also Section 231. See S. AFR. CONST. of
1996, ch. 14, § 231. However, Sections 232 and 233 of the new Constitution contain additional
clarifying provisions. See id. at §§ 232-33. Raylene Keightly provides an astute analysis of the
distinctions between the treatment given public international law and treaties under the IC and
the new Constitution. See Raylene Keightley, Public International Law and the Final Constitution,
12 (3) S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 405 (1996).
See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 15, § 231.
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IC and to determine whether there was a conflict between it and the
Act. Despite the potential benefit of a more protracted analysis, the
Court's limited analysis was justified because the Court determined
that the IC was superior to any international instrument in the event
these sources conflicted."
0
D. T/wAZAPO Challenge
Analysis of the substantive issues in AZAPO was quite straightfor-
ward. Nevertheless, the Court went to great lengths to demonstrate
its understanding of and sensitivity to the important national ques-
tion at the heart of the dispute. In the end, the amnesty process in-
volves the most complex balance of rights and responsibilities in
South Africa today. For those testifying before the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission, their right to amnesty is conditioned on their
fulfillment of the difficult obligation to be truthful. For the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission and the people of South Africa,
however, the right to the truth about the past entails a concomitant
obligation to undertake the challenging task of forgiveness.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section II used Zuma to illustrate the Court's first steps."" It also
introduced the provisions of the interim Constitution that profoundly
influenced the Court's interpretive approach: the limitations clause
located in Section 33 and Section 35's mandate to consider interna-
tional and foreign law. The discussion of Makwanyane in Section III
revealed the young Court's greatest application of its intellect and its
authority in the presence of great public interest as it decided the
constitutionality of the death penalty."2 With a broad consideration
of international authorities, the opinion exemplifies the Court's en-
during comparative constitutional methodology. Analysis of the
opinion also reveals how the usefulness of comparative constitutional
interpretation may be limited by differences in constitutional struc-
ture, social culture and national history. Section IV highlighted this
point by briefly reviewing the judgment in Gauteng Provincial Legisla-
ture.413 Focusing on the Court's discretion under Section 35, this sec-
tion raised questions about how and when the Court can be expected
to employ a comparative constitutional approach in its analysis of an
"1o See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 688. Justice Mahomed drew a distinction between the use of in-
ternational instruments to determine the constitutionality of a provision and the use of instruments to
color the content of a right actually granted. See i&. ("International law and the contents of the interna-
tional treaties to which South Africa might or might not be at any particular time are, in my view, rele-
vant only in the interpretation of the Constitution itself...
41' See supra Section IL
" See supra Section IlL
" See supra Section IV.
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inherently local constitutional question.
A definitive answer to these questions would be speculative at best,
and Section IV begins to introduce the elements which complicate
the Court's ability to successfully embrace Section 35's mandate to
consider foreign authority. These elements include the set of positive
obligations introduced by the interim Constitution and further ex-
414panded upon in the new Constitution. Few countries have such ex-
tensive positive obligations. Perhaps, more importantly, the fulfill-
ment of these obligations in South Africa may depend upon local
political and fiscal constraints. Under these circumstances, the Court
must undertake its analysis of such obligations creatively in order to
accord the appropriate respect to its obligations under Section 35.
Although the Court was understandably not very successful in this re-
gard in Gauteng, the judgement in AZAPO, reviewed in Section V,St 'l • 415
stands as a clear victory. In AZAPO, the Court succeeded beautifully
in rendering a judgment on a quintessentially local matter-the exis-
tence of a commission to record the truth about the apartheid years-
while including poignant comparative constitutional jurisprudence.
Overall, the Court has made significant strides in its short exis-
tence. Defying early criticism, it has demonstrated its impartiality and
autonomy while earning the esteem of the major political parties. It
has eschewed the adoption of a political question escape hatch, ruled
both for and against positions taken by the other branches of the na-
tional government and rendered judgments on sensitive issues.416 De-
spite sporadic outbursts of public opinion, each of the governmental
organs has heeded the orders of the Court without rancor at the ex-
ercise of its power. The cooperation of the other branches of the
government and the educational and judicious temperament of the
Court's rulings have contributed to the firm establishment of the
Court as an effective and even crucial element of the new South Af-
rica. By sifting through a myriad of useful and less useful interna-
tional and foreign approaches to rights interpretation, the Justices of
the Court developed a modern constitutional jurisprudence of
unique and rigorous sincerity. Their adoption of a hybrid "generous"
and "purposive" approach is only natural in the historical context of
South Africa.
As the more egregious legal remnants of apartheid are progres-
sively discarded, and the judiciary digests and follows the Court's
41 See supra section IV, Part E, for an overview of the positive obligations created by the new Con-
stitution.
"5 See supra Section V.
416 See Ex parte Speaker of the Kwazula-Natal Provincial Legislature; In re Kwazulu-Natal Amak-
hosi and Iziphakanyiswa Amendment Bill of 1995, 1996 (4) SALR 653 (CC); AZAPO, 1994 (4) SALR
671 (CC) (determining whether the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is constitutional); Gauteng
Provincial Legislature, 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC) (considering whether the constitution required the
government to support racially exclusive schools); Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (deciding tie
constitutionality of the death penalty).
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early precedents, the Court's jurisprudence will evolve. Discourse al-
ready has migrated away from the more technical and theoretical
anal sis characteristic of the early judgments like Zuma and Makwany-
ane. As if heeding their own counsel of incrementalism, the Justices
have also moved away from providing a comprehensive treatment of
all the matters before the Court and toward a more focused review of
narrower issues. This trend is exemplified by Gauteng Provincial Legis-
lature which also illustrates the different, but most often complemen-
tary, judicial styles of theJustices 8
AZAPO represents a natural blending of styles." 9 The easier, more
technical issue of the status of the statement of national unity, was
dealt with expediently, reminiscent of the key issue raised in Gau-
teng42 The more complex issue, regarding whether there is an intra-
constitutional limitation applying to the actual procedures enacted by
Parliament for granting amnesty, was carefully considered on the ba-
sis of two analyses. The first involved a canvassing of international
and foreign comparative experiences, similar to Zuma.f' The second
involved an exercise of constitutional soul-searching at its most noble,
in which the Court carefully contextualized the link between the rela-
tively peaceful transition to constitutional democracy and the negoti-
ated promise of amnesty.4
AZAPO made clear that at least two interpretive forces, transna-
tional and national, will continue their interplay in the Court's delib-
erations. Equally clear was the realization that the Court will con-
tinue to undertake its responsibilities to consider foreign
jurisprudence seriously under Section 39 of the new Constitution.
Drawing from the decisions discussed, the CCT is more likely to re-
sort to external sources in the context of perplexing questions which:
have not already been addressed in the context of the new
Constitution-as was the case in both Zuma and Maklaany-
ane;
(ii) are not easily resolved on the basis of the texts in-
volved-the majority found this to be the case in Gautleng
Provincial Legislature, although Justice Sachs' erudite con-
"'The CCTs reasoning in these cases is discussed in Sections 1 and Ill See Makwianyane. 1995
(3) SALR 642; Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR 642.
18 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC).
... AZAPO is discussed in Section V. See AZAPO. 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC).
' See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 682-3; Guareng Provincial Legislature. 1996 (3) SALR at 177
(holding that Section 32(c) does not oblige the state to establish schools based upon a common culture.
language or religion).
"' See AZ4PO, 1996 (4) SALR at 686-87; Zuna, 1995 (2) SALR at 654-62. See supra Section V,
Part B, for a discussion of the Court's analysis in AZAPO.
' See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 683-94. See supra Section V, Part C. for a discussion of the use
of comparative sources by the CCT in AZ4PO.
42 See S. AF. CONSr. of 1996, ch. 2, § 39 (1) (providing that courts, tribunals, and forums "must
consider international law.., and foreign law."); S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC). ch. 3. § 35 (1) (provid-
ing that courts must "have regard to public international law."). Section 39 replaced Section 35 of the
interim Constitution.
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curring opinion provides a poignant counterweight; and
(iii) are not so fundamentally intertwined with uniquely
South African matters as to severely diminish the probative
value of extraterritorial references-the opposite was true
in AZAPO.
424
Where these factors have not constrained comparative analysis, the
Constitutional Court has demonstrated that it takes its Section 35
mandate very seriously.42 5 As illustrated by the evaluation of the use
of probative legislative history in Makwanyane and the consideration
of commentary regarding examples of other truth commissions in
AZAPO, 426 the Court has never hesitated to resort to external sources
in its interpretation whether or not the reference related directly to
the interpretation of a protected right as permitted under Section 35.
Although the Court has admittedly become more comfortable with
certain aspects of Canadian jurisprudence than any other country,
4 27
it did explain in AZAPO that there is a limit to the usefulness of ex-
ternal sources. For South African jurisprudence, external sources are
at best an interpretive aid. They are neither binding holdings nor
authoritative suggestions of the Court's ultimate position.
Even so, the Court continues to include jurisdictions other than
the older Western democracies in its analysis. In addition to refer-
ences to United States, German and English jurisprudence, the Court
makes intermittent references to judgments of courts in Africa,2 8
Central Europe,42 and South Asia.4N° This cross-pollination must not
be undervalued. It is one of the most important aspects of the evolu-
tion of modern constitutional jurisprudence. The recent increase in
the number of independent states following the Cold War has re-
sulted in a concomitant increase in references to international and
comparative law. Many of the new constitutions contain provisions
12. Cf., e.g., Harksen v. Lane NO and Others, 1998 (1) SALR 300, 317-18 (CC) (discussing
the necessity of exhausting non-constitutional remedies for domestic issues) with AZAPO, 1996
(4) SALR 671 (CC) (resting upon the unique provisions of the IC regarding the special powers
granted the executive during the transition period) and Executive Council, Western Cape Leg-
islature, and Others v. President of the Rep. of S. Mr. and Others, 1995 (4) SALR 877 (CC)
(considering the validity of amendments to a local government act).
" See supra Sections II(C), II(D), and III(E), discussing the role of comparative constitutional
analysis in the Zuma and Makwanyane decisions.
See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 687-88; Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SAIR at 404-409.
See Makvanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 436-38; Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 656.
" The court has considered jurisprudence from courts in Tanzania and Botswana. See
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 at 428 n.103; id. at 490-91 (Mahomed,J., concurring). There
were even early attempts to include references to traditional African jurisprudence and value
systems reflected in the teachings of tribal elders and the writings of historians. See, e.g., Mak-
wanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 516 (Sachs, J., concurring); id. at 481-83 (Langa,J., concurring); id.
at 483-84 (Madala, J., concurring); id. at 500-01 (Mokgoro, J., concurring) (all discussing the
traditional principle of ubuntu, which places significant value on life and human dignity).
"9, See id. at 415 (explaining that the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared the death penalty to
be unconstitutional); id. at 423 (discussing the German approach to the death penalty).
,s See id. at 426-28 (discussing the development of death penalty jurisprudence in India).
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similar to Section 35.451 Other courts should follow South Africa's
lead in reviewing comparative constitutional jurisprudence from
otherjurisdictions. In addition to finding potentially useful material,
this international cross-citation also lets other countries know that
their judicial decisions are being scrutinized for what the) disclose
about their society's respect for human rights. The consideration of
comparative sources also reveals the effect of textual, contextual and
cultural distinctions on interpretive styles and substantive outcomes.
Of equal importance, however, is that this exchange helps local
judges in newer democracies feel welcomed and respected in what is
becoming a global judiciary.
As the Court gains experience and precedents take root, the
Court's need to canvass international and foreign comparative juris-
prudence for insights and guidance may diminish. The return of
South Africa to the Commonwealth may contribute to this process.
However, the new language of Section 39(1) (b) requires the courts
to consider public international law in terms that appear to allow for
less discretion than Section 35 provided."2
In the meantime, the Court has brought an impressive array ofju-
risprudence to bear on its interpretations while carefully tailoring its
judgments to both the text and the spirit of the interim Constitution.
Without the benefit of a body of acceptable jurisprudence developed
over time, as has occurred in the United States, Section 35 and its
homologue have forced the South African courts to rise to interna-
tional standards concerning the protection of rights. Without foreign
guidance, the mixture of old practices and new rules might have re-
sulted in a system that appeared and functioned like the old regime.
The judicial system in South Africa has not expunged all the ves-
tiges of apartheid. A few examples of the continued problem include
judges who have sentenced youths to whippings even after lii7iand
abolition of juvenile whipping," ajudge who demanded only a 1,000
rand bail in the case of a man who beat a black child to death for
playing with a white child,' and the farmers who began pushing life-
long farm laborers and their families off their land in order to deny
them rights under the Land Restitution ACL"
In this light, it is clear that the process of adaptation to the new
"' See; eg., CAN. CONST. § 1; EST. CONsr. ch. 1, art. 3; HUNG. CONsT. § 7; RUss. CONST., ch.
i, art. XV, § 4, ch. II, art. XVII, § 1.
'
2 See supra text accompanying notes 189, 196.
See State v. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR 632 (outlasting the use of whipping as a punishment
ofjuvenile defendants).
'See Helen Grange, A.NC Outragad By Fanners' CrudAts. THE STARJuly 7,1995. The articie
also describes five additional accounts of similarly horrific acts and followed by shameful judi-
cial leniency. See id.
See Eddie Koch, Grave Dispute Stirs the Land Pot, MAIL & GLYARDLAN, SepL 8-14, 1995 (de-
scribing the struggles between labor-tenants and land-omers). But set Eddie Koch. Fanra-mr are
Ready to Sail on the Winds of Change, MAIL & GUARDiAN, July 7-13, 1995 (finding pragmatic farm-
ers who support a new proposal for land distribution).
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Constitution is not yet complete. So far, the Court has successfully
balanced its Section 35 mandate and the necessary "South Africaniza-
tion" of international references in its new constitutional jurispru-
dence. However, the Constitutional Court must continue to lead the
judiciary in this direction. Although the Court's modus operandi is un-
likely to change in light of the new Constitution, certain interpretive
adaptations may be required to accommodate the differences in the
text. First, although Section 36 no longer contains the "essential con-
tent" phrasing that existed in Section 33, one can only speculate as to
how the Court will interpret Section 36's rephrasing of the limitations
clause.436 Second, future interpretive turbulence might arise if a split
emerges within the Court over the weight that should be given to the
economic costs of its holdings given the expansive nature of the new
Constitutions positive obligations. Justice Didcott's concurring opin-
ion in AZAPO accents this potential difficulty.*7 Although the issue
may remain in the background of the Court's reasoning, the list of
"relevant factors" in Section 36 of the new Constitution is not exclu-
sive. This leaves room for cost considerations to figure into the
Court's future limitations analysis. As Justice Didcott's observed,"9
economic pragmatism is rarely an appropriate consideration in the
context of rights interpretation. Further, outside of the context of
the right to education, the rights and State obligations included in
the Bill of Rights do not include an internal provision for their "pro-
gressive" implementation."0 This conundrum, I submit, is one of the
primary reasons the Court is empowered under Section 172 of the
new Constitution to suspend its declaration of invalidity. 441 It is fitting
that fiscal considerations be considered in the context of the formu-
". Cf S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 3, § 36 (1) (providing that limitations on rights must be "reason-
able and justifiable in an open and democratic society.") with S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, §
33(1)(b) (providing that limitations "shall not negate the essential content of the right in question.").
." See supra note 386.
See supra text accompanying note 91.
See supra text accompanying note 365.
4 See Vemaas, 1995 (3) SALR at 300 (CC) (Didcott, J.) ("[Tihe Constitution does not en-
visage, and it will surely not brook, an undue delay in the fulfillment of any promise made by it
about a fundamental right."). But see S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), sched. 6, art. XXI, § I
("Transitional Agreements") ("Where the new Constitution requires the enactment of national
or provincial legislation, that legislation must be enacted by the relevant authority within a rea-
sonable period of the date the new Constitution took effect."). This provision should permit at
least some reasonable delay in the implementation of many of the rights listed, but the question
remains whether the Court will interpret Article 21's reasonable in the same way it interprets Sec-
tion 29's progressively. One indication that the Court's patience may be limited is evident in its
1997 ruling in Minister ofJustice v. Ntuli, in which the Court denied the Ministry's request for an
extension of the period which the Court had granted for the development of legislation regard-
ing a detainee's right to appeal. See generally Minister ofJustice v. Ntuli, CCT 15/97 (June 1997)
(visited Aug. 28, 1998)
<http://vwv.law.wits.ac.za./judgements/ntuli97.html>.
4 See S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 8, § 172 (1) (b) (ii) (authorizing the Court to issue "an or-
der suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow the
competent authority to correct the defect").
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lation of orders by the Court and its exercise of discretion under Sec-
don 172 of the Constitution.
As the Court allocates more of its time to disputes concerning the
national, provincial and local balances of power, it must be careful to
safeguard the integrity of its precedents and, ultimately, to complete
its construction of the judicial foundations on which the protection
of South Africa's new rights will depend. It is too soon in the evolu-
tion of South African constitutional democracy to stop reminding the
judiciary of its duties under the new Constitution. Turning off the
beacon of external authority that guides the judiciary by revealing
both the successes and the mistakes of other jurisdictions would be
premature. The Court must continue to emphasize the relevance,
utility, and importance of transnational jurisprudence in rights inter-
pretation.
